# Money Definition Paper Summary:: # Notes ## Links [[Definition of Money]] ## Backlinks > [!Info]- Ignore dataview >## Backlink >Ignore this dataview. Plugins don't work on the website >```dataview Table Status, type as "Type" from [[]] and !outgoing([[]]) sort file.name asc >``` --- # References ![Brief Review of the History of Money's Definition: The purpose of this section is to illustrate how definitions of money have been founded on the quest to measure a generic "'value" in a standard and universal fashion and how those attempts share a common ontological flaw that has persisted to this day. Essentially and over millennia, the same notion of money/ s technological function has persisted as if on faith, without at any point in time having rationally or scientifically determined it according to any clear logical proposal, as for example is commonly the case with information technology solutions developed today. This may be understandable for early history, however one would expect as with the history of science, to be able to map a concrete progression in reasoning and proofs as for example was the case the motion of bodies from Aristotle to Newton, each interim step illuminating the path to the next, such as Galileo's observation of the uniform motion of gravity put to rest Aristotle's view based on the "'nature of objects" and thus lead to Newton's formulation which has remained useful to this day. Throughout most recorded history, notions of money have all revolved around a single intuitive association of countable units in the form of coins and sometimes also in terms of quantities of standard commodities. In Ancient Babylon, "money» (shekel) was a measure of quantities of barley and silver. According to "The Code of Hammurabi"[l] '[payment!' was to be made according to both "moneV' and "grain"/"corn" depending on the type of transaction. In this light, it would seem that the underlying link to a generic notion of value was to both food staples ("grain"/"corn") and "moneV' (coins). As the vast majority were not literate, and therefore were unable to either maintain or produce written records, the use of coins also most certainly served as a rudimentary counting device for a minimal notion of record keeping. In ancient Greece, money also took the form of measures of silver and gold minted into coins by city states but without the parallel formal reference to any other measure or staple production. With regards to money, Aristotle vvrote: "There must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by agreement ffor which reason it is called money); for it is this that makes all things commensurate, since all things are measured by money. LetA be a house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is halfofB, if the house is worth five minae or equal to them; the bed, C, is a tenth of B; it is plain, then, how many beds are equal to a house, viz. five. That exchange took place thus before there was money is plain; for it makes no difference whether it is five beds that exchange for a house, or the money value offive beds. " [2] Here and absent the use of less exclusive staple commodities as a parallel reference of value as was the case in Babylon, the proposition was to represent "the value of all things" in terms of coins of a standard measure of value and as a rudimentary accounting mechanism. Similarly, in the Indo-Greek Kingdom, China and later in Rome, coins were used as a common reference of generic value. Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 2 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2002.bmp) ![At the time of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776), the nature of money was not re- defined and it is to be assumed that historic notions were simply intuitively subsumed. It is worth noting that, Adam Smith [3], refers to labour as the underlying value of all things that money "more or less" attempts to represent. Thus and irrespective of the question of an exact definition or the format of money, the motivation is to achieve a fair representation (measure) of a common universal notion of value in the form of "human labour". Yet, still no formal mathematical or other logical proof of how money, without loss of generality and however manifested, can rationally represent that generic or universal value. All Smith provides is a speculation that silver appears to maintain a constant ratio with respect to other things and that all things in the market are due to an investment in labour the "original purchase-money". Similarly with David Ricardo[4] the motivation is that of seeking a true measure of value in terms of the value of labour but extended and modified by the value of a community ofthe land owners, providers of stock or capital and labourers, all of which according to Adam Smith, reduce to the common denominator of labour. But again, Ricardo does not question how this universal value can have its proper and indeed equitable representation in the form of money. William Stanley Jevons [5] defined money as all of four distinct functions a "store of value", a "medium of exchange", a "standard of value" and a "common measure of value". This definition minus the mention of "standard of value" and modi&ing "measure of value" to "unit of account" is what has become today's de facto definition. But, once again, no formal or logical proof is provided as a rationale for exactly how money whether commodity based or fiat actually performs these functions, nor are any logical and temporal dependencies between the different objects and functions defined and no sine-qua-non proof of how money represents any universal notion of value without loss of generality is provided. Similarly Karl Marx, Keynes, Fisher, Samuelson and so on, with regards to both money as a commodity (gold and silver) or fiat money, apparently none establish any objective proof of how money is purported to be. In all cases, Money's definition as a universal representation of value is never formally proven but is determined by appeal to circumstance such as with Fishe€s note [6]. "Any commodity to be called "money" must be generally acceptable in exchange, and any commodity generally acceptable in exchange should be called money. " This says nothing about how and on what basis money performs its functions, but simply affirms that it must be a commodity to do so. According to Keynes [7], Money cannot be "produced by labour" but, if it could be manufactured depressions would be avoided. This is a powerful testament attesting to the notion that money does not represent the value of other things but rather is itself some sort of pseudo commodity vying for its own independent demand like any other commodity. Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 3 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2003.bmp) ![He later rather sarcastically writes: "Unemployment develops, that is to say, because people want the moon;—men cannot be employed when the object of desire (i.e. money) is something which cannot be produced and the demand for which cannot be readily choked off. There is no remedy but to persuade the public that green cheese is practically the same thing and to have a green cheese factory (i.e. a central bank) under public control. " From all the above, it is evident that, throughout history, money has been intuitively defined and apparently a posteriori to its use. That is, there is no point where moneys function has been rationally determined on the basis of any provable axioms and a priori to its use. The singular recurrent claim, documented throughout history and to this very day, is that Money is somehow simultaneously both a unit of measure of some universal value common to all things, as well as a tradeable artefact of independent value. Yet, nowhere in history has this notion been proven to be rational irrespective of it having been adopted over and over again. However, what history does show, without dispute, is that money in all its forms has been a medium not so much of value, but of information about value and a very imperfect one at that, as explained by Narayana Kocherlakota [8], in querying the technological role of money: "My argument demonstrates the vacuity of the three standard explanations of the role of fiat money in an economy: money acts as a store of value, a medium of exchange, and a unit of account From a technological point ofview, we can see that none of these functions really require money. Money does not represent a new way for society to accumulate wealth. Money does not reduce the costs of transferring resources from one person to another. There is no immediate technological reason that money should be a better numeraire than other goods. The traditional explanations for the presence of money in an economy are more descriptive of its functions than explanatory. The true explanation for money's presence is that money is a record-keeping device. " He then concludes: "Monetary economics has traditionally been dominated by the question of how the quantity of money, or the growth rate of that quantity, affects prices and quantities of goods. My reasoning here suggests that this focus is misplaced. Money is a record-keeping device; hence, monetary policy should be designed so that record-keeping is performed in the most efficient way possible. How do we do that? Currently, we do not know. But searching for the answers should lead to a more satisfactory (and robust) understanding of optimal monetary policy. " So, at least in formal mathematical terms, Kocherlakota makes it clear that the only certain and persistent purpose and function is to record/measure consumption, i.e. it is information about value in so much as what is consumed can be considered "value". Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 4 ](Marc%20Gauvin%20-%20Page%204.bmp) ![How to Define Money? An exercise in First Order Logic and Decidability "I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between formal and natural language". Richard Montague [9] Information science is concerned organising and operating on data to provide useful i.e. meaningful information, which in turn requires the use of Formal Semantic analysis to unambiguously define a given domain of discourse. The most common type of Formal Semantics requires the mapping of terms to a concrete universe of individuals and mapping of propositions to the truth values "true" and "false". Some basic notions follow: A "class" defines a set of individual objects or concepts ALL of which share ALL of a distinct set of one or more properties. Therefore, one class cannot be an "individual" of another because it itself is a collection of individuals; however, providing its individuals possess ALL the properties of the first class, it can be a sub-class. Thus, other classes that do not share ALL "'Parent Class" properties cannot be sub-classes of that class. "Properties" are distinct features or attributes that define both a class and its individuals, and therefore cannot themselves be individuals of the class. For example, you can say that a car has the property of "having wheel", but that fact doesn't imply that "wheel" is an individual of the class "'car*' i.e. an instance of "wheel" has none of the properties of the class "car". So, while "having wheel" is a property of "car", "wheel" cannot be classified as a type of "car". The same basic notions must apply to the definition of "Money' and then at a deeper level, we must ask, what logically forces any conflation in the first place? If as Kocherlakota contends, money in reality is only a mnemonic device, do we need to conflate the notions of "store", "medium" and '[unit of accoun€'? Particularly considering that while money so defined, "does not reduce the costs of transferring resources" as Kocherlakota asserts, it certainly does increase them! Dissection of the current definition of money as all of a "store of value", a "medium of exchange" and a "unit of account". The first question is whether or not "money» is a class in its own right or a subclass of something else. From the definition it seems to be a subclass of three different classes, so right from the start, we have a serious ontological question that implies profound consequences on how money can be rationally interpreted and used. If we say that money defines a class of its own, then we have the problem of what is called horizontal or "multiple inheritance", that is money would have to inherit properties from "'store", "medium", "uni€', "account" etc„ without being either an individual nor a subclass of either of these. In this case, all the inherited properties would require specialising existing property subclasses or introduce completely new Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 5 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2004.bmp) ![property classes in the parent It is for this reason that multiple inheritance has always proven problematic when not outright excluded. The use of the key terms "store", "medium", "uni€', "account" in defining money is intensional as opposed to extensionall i.e. it is connotative of money, not an enumerated list of examples of what has been used as money e.g. notes, metals, shells, grain... As such, we approach our analysis of the validity of the current definition, by defining the underlying terms, i.e. what are the minimum and sufficient properties of "store of value", "medium of exchange", "unit of account". From Oxford Dictionaries [10]: "Store ofValue": Storel: "A quantity or supply of something kept for use as needed." Value-a: "The regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of somethin<' Valueg: "The numerical amount denoted by an algebraic term; a magnitude, quantity, or number. Quantityl: The amount or number of a material or abstract thing not usually estimated by spatial measurement. Interpretations, money is either; Case a. A quantity of the regard of importance, worth something"; Case b. A quantity of a quantity or number. "Medium of Exchange"• Mediumi: An agency or means of doing something: or usefulness of Agency3.1: A thing or person that acts to produce a particular result Meansl: An action or system by which a result is achieved; a method. Exchangel: An act of giving one thing and receiving another (especially of the same kind) in return. Interpretation: Money is: a means of exchanging things. "Unit of Accoune': Uniti: An individual thing or person regarded as single and complete but which can also form an individual component of a larger or more complex whole: Units: A quantity chosen as a standard in terms of which other quantities may be expressed (measure). I In logic, "intension" not to be confused with "intentional" refers to the content of concepts as opposed to the extension which refers to the range of a term or concept as measured by the objects that it denotes or contains. Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 6 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2005.bmp)   ![quantity' of "units" of "value" in which case neither can "unit of account" be a "standard quantity' which introduces a contradiction in the definition. The final question is money a "means of exchange"? For such a proposition to be true, money must perform actions and according to the definition, money is a mere record" not an apparatus or system in and of itself as required by the definition of "means"' Therefore, it is inanimate and at most only a component of a "means of exchange without constituting such on its own. Thus, the only wholly consistent interpretation of the definition that can be derived is: Money: A record of a measure of value. That is, money is a record of a specialisation of the class "Measure" and therefore must inherit all the properties of its parent class. Money, a record of a measure of value vs a commodity and Stability If money is generated by transactions as a record (annotation) OF the value of goods/services being transacted as described by the Bank of England [11] [12], then that record cannot be assigned INDEPENDENT value in and of itself. This can be shown by an elementary proof illustrating that no matter the independent value of an annotation, that value cannot be considered if the purpose is to represent the value of other things: Definitions Let A 2 0 (annotated value of goods/services transacted) Let B 2 0 (independent value attributed to the record of value i.e. "money") Let C = A+B (Total value of any record) Proof IfA>O and 8>0, then A+B and C If B = A then A+B = A If and onh/ if A and B = O. Therefore for any A, C = A if and only If 3 = O! End of Proof. In colloquial terms, the value of any annotation C of the value of some object or thing A cannot have attributed any independent value B other than zero, because otherwise, the annotation C would no longer be of A but rather of A+B. That is to say that money cannot both represent the value of goods and services as well as having ascribed any independent value ofits own.[13] Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 9 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2008.bmp) ![Unit Cost and Destabilization: Another approach is to consider how any systematic unit cost or value attributed to money explicit or implicit (e.g. any direct or indirect cost per unit such as a lag between unit access and realisation of transactions) will necessarily destabilise the value of the unit of account as follows: Let a be the initial value of any good or service G and h be the cost (in currency) of each currency unit used to represent a, in subsequent Ti transfers of G, then, a (1+ h)i, vi-l = a (1+ h)i-l and vi > vi-l for any h > O [13] Therefore, Since increase in value attributed to G requires the arbitrary summation of units independent or exogenous of the measure of value of G, then it can be affirmed that any such exogenous "interference" is the sole cause of instability of value measure in the system because in the absence of such interference, the system is stable by default! We know that in todavs world and in all instances, money consists of mere annotations of multiples of monetary symbols (E, S, E, Y, etc.) and ALL Euros are issued as such against either public debt or public or private assets as collateral, the latter traditionally representing the vast majority of money in "circulation". All such '[money' is created through loan contracts and all bear some or other interest charges proportional to both the initial sums and time i.e., all subsume the notion of money as a commercial object of trade. However, as shown above, money is in reality nothing more than a record of the measure of value, this logically precludes that it itself be subject to any change in value in terms of itself. Similarly, money as a measure ofvalue is not susceptible to any limit of supply, as being a measure of the value of goods and services transacted, it necessarily must be a posteriori to these and must arise as abundantly and readily as do any quantity of goods and services that are required to be transacted. Therefore and as a measure, there can be no so called variable "Time Value of Money» as money must be the constant against which all other value is measured. So that: Potential consumption cannot logically be limited by availability of units of value measure, but only by availability of goods and services themselves. Moreover, neither can money be the object of lending; at most it can only record the value of the goods and services that are themselves the only true objects of loans and payment and indeed of value in the system. Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 10 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2009.bmp) ![A legal Proposal for judicial correction of public and private money contracts as a matter of legal first impression. It is odd to see, how in spite of our technological prowess and advances in information technology, money has escaped rigorous formal logical definition. Thus, it is imperative that the issue of determining the true logical nature and definition of money be raised in the context of public and private contracts, for which we must ask the following questions, particularly with regards to the chronic failure of "Constitutional Contract" i.e. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms2 dictated by monetary criteria but in the absence of any unequivocal standard technical and legal definition of mon ey: a. b. Does the absence of a definition somehow limit the application of principles of law or provide otherwise unwarranted credence to "customary practices"? Pursuant to the principle of validity "quae ab initio non valent, ex post facto convalescere non possune' (What is innlid at the beginning cannot be made valid by subsequent acts) and in the case current assumptions as to what money is are proven invalid or mutually exclusive, are current contracts rendered impossible? Thus, we cannot afford that logical inconsistencies become the basis of righteous rules of law, nor can we permit to wittingly or unw•ittingly become accomplices of a psychological conditioning that constitutes a veritable Psychological Operation as has been coined in "The Money PSYOP".[17] We believe that none of this is necessary and that an orderly resolution can be arrived at on the basis of weighing the tremendous advantages of resolving this issue outside of partisan dogma and beliefs in terms of immediate relief from the unfounded instability inherent in current common practices. The only place that a definition of money is implied is in Portuguese and other European legislationss and upon defining loan agreements for transactions of "fungible objects" as indicated by Article 1142 of the Portuguese Civil Code that reads: "Mütuo é o contrato pelo qual uma das partes empresta å outra dinheiro ou outra coisa fungfvel, ficando a segunda obrigada a restituir outro tanto do mesmo género e qualidade. " (Through mutual agreement whereby ons of the parties gives the other money or some otherfungible thing, obliges or requires that the second restore a quantity to the lender of the same species and quality.) However and under the current paradigm, money cannot be considered a fungible object due to the fact that its purported "exchange value" the only attribute that confers any notion of "quality" to money is, under current assumptions, a variable as 2 For example the right to work and the right to job security provided in the articles 53 and 58 ofthe Portuguese Constitution. The first one says that it is guaranteed to the workers stability in their jobs and it is forbidden the unfair dismissal due to political or ideological reasons. The second expresses the idea that everybody has the right to have a job. 3 Similarly and m a Comparative Law perspective, the definition ofloan agreement versed in the alticle 1753 of the Spanish Civil Code says the same thing. Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 11 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2010.bmp)  ![current form by raising the issue of the absence of an unequftnJcal legal definition of Money, in light of the demonstrable inability to guarantee full application of Constitutional and fundamental Rights and general principles of law in a question of legal first impressions. Portuguese author Nuno Manuel Pinto de Oliveira et al. contends that the problem of admissibility or inadmissibility of contracts, arises when the content of contracts confuses, or at least confronts the principles that prevent the application of unfair laws. The control of the imbalance and unfairness of money contracts directly corresponds to the lack of application of particular rules of law via the non application of general rules of law as stipulated by article 406 of the Portuguese Civil Code. The criteria for resolving the eternal problem of unfair application of the law is the so called Radbruch Formula: '[Whenever the application of positive law, results in such a high degree of injustice as to put into question its legality, then there can be no doubt that the unfairness of the positive law must yield to a higher justice." [18] Nuno Pinto de Oliveira says that the non application criteria of unfair laws as described by Radbruch must be adapted to Contract Law, but only limited to the judicial control of the correctness or incorrectness of the content of contracts in the case of disproportions or imbalances — more succinctly: in cases where injustice is evident and blatant. [19] Similarly, James Gordley advocates judicial correction of all contracts in which one party is enriched at the expense of another. The judicial control over the content of contracts corresponds, in first instance, to the application of legal rational and reasonable criteria preferred by the law and only in the last instance to the criteria as agreed by the contracting parties. [20] Our response is based on the continued relevance of Irving Fisher's admonition in "The Money Illusion" where he concludes: "In this and the previous chapter we have seen that unstable money robs sometimes one class and sometimes another; that it upsets all sorts of calculations and economic relationships and adjustments; that it causes harmful fluctuations in trade and employment, and produces discontent, labor troubles, class hatred and violence; and that in the end it represents a general economic loss. These evils of unstable money may be reduced to three: social injustice, social discontent and social inefficiency." [21] It is the instability of such a system without proper rigorous definition of its key component i.e. money, that is at the heart of most if not all the problems the Eurozone is facing right now, i.e. the European depression and the measures emerging from a financial advisory class that is adversely affecting all aspects of society today. A wiuch of interpretation of is which hu in reported cue. it of fm-st in the sate sates or be Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 13 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2012.bmp) ![Thus: The current monetary and financial system operates on the following false premises: 1. 2. 3. That there exists a valid common definition of money that can be expressed in valid formal objective logic, obeys natural law that is wholly consistent with the assumptions, terms and conditions of current money contracts; That the parties to current money contracts are fully aware of all aspects such a formal definition; That the validity of the contracts is determined solely by mutual agreement of the parties.[22] The Constitutions of European Member States cede to their respective Constitutional Courts, European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights, the unique prerogative to amend their terms and effects, in order to guarantee the enforcement of the principle of separation of powers and ultimately of democratic rule of law. However, only for issues of legal certainty, equity, or public interest of exceptional importance [23] and in accordance with Article 282, paragraph 4 of the Portuguese Constitution when justified. In this sense, all that needs to be ascertained, before or during any legal action, is whether or not there exists a logically valid common definition of money that is both universally recognized and understood by all parties to all financial and money contracts. It is clear that absence of such is proof ofthe invalidity of current contracts. Similarly, if any such definition does not support the logical assumptions, terms and conditions of current contracts and common practices, the contracts would also prove to be invalid. Thus, if ever there was, this is a matter of exceptional and urgent public interest. Are the parties capable of immediately providing or accessing such formal and logically valid definitions of money? Will all or the majority of proposed definitions be both logically sound and equivalent? Recently, the European Court of Human Rights has included the notion of substantive equality in determining Justice. This, in contrast to simply formalising equality, the Court adopts a substantive conception that takes into account all facets relevant to how rights are violated. The central question in the case at hand, is not whether the law makes distinctions, nor whether or not the state is motivated by prejudice, but whether or not the effect of the law takes into account the substantive organic effect of an ill defined and unstable money system, showing how that instability translates into systematic effects that perpetuate inequality, disadvantage, discrimination, exclusion, involuntary unemployment, etc., impeding the optimal exercise of fundamental rights. [24] It is for this reason that this issue warrants being presented to the Judiciary on a first impression basis. Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 14 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2013.bmp) ![Concretely and as an example of a matter of first impression, on June 16th 2015, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) issued its final decision regarding the liability of a news portal for offensive comments made by its users. In the case Delfi AS v. Estonia (application no. 64569/09, the "Case"), [25] the ECHR decided that holding an internet news portal liable for comments made by a third-party commentator to the portal's site, is not in breach of the portal's freedom to impart information. A brief background of the case follows: In January 2006, the applicant Delfi AS, the owner of one of the biggest commercial internet news portals in Estonia, published an article on its webpage about a local ferry company. Thereafter, some of the site's users wrote highly offensive and threatening comments about the ferry company and its owner. While Delfi AS deleted the comments about 6 weeks after publishing the article, the owner of the ferry company nevertheless successfully sued the news portal. The Estonian Courts decided that the limitation of liability for service providers for the distributed content by third parties (stipulated in Directive 2000/31/EC transposed to internal national law) was not applicable in this case. Therefore, they found Delfi AS liable for the comments and awarded compensation to the owner of the ferry company in the amount of approx. €320 for non - pecuniary damages. In 2009, Delfi AS filed an application to the ECHR, complaining that it had been found liable for comments made by third parties. With its judgement of the 10th of October 2013, the Chamber of the ECHR decided that there had been no violation of article 10 (freedom of expression) ofthe European Convention of Human Rights. In response, at the beginning of 2014, Delfi AS requested the case be reviewed by the Grand Chamber ofthe ECHR. The Grand Chamber of the ECHR narrowed its assessment to determining the duties and responsibilities, under Article 10 S 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights, of commercially run internet news portals that provide users the option of generating comments on published content where those comments could include unlawful speech. Finding that there had not been unjustified and disproportional restriction on Delfi AS's freedom of expression, the decisive jury considered the following main aspects of the case: a) Although Delfi AS had not been the actual writer of the unlawful comments, it had full control over its internet platform; b) Delfi AS had not ensured a realistic possibility for any affected party to hold the actual authors of the unlawful comments liable; c) Delfi AS's efforts in preventing and removing the unlawful comments without delay had been insuffcient. d) The awarded compensation (approx. EUR 320) was not only not excessive, but actually modest Similarly, and referring to the above quote of Fisher from "The Money Illusion" [21], and the current severe impact of unfounded standard beliefs and notions about money, the question of broad social and third party liability as a question of first impression needs to be brought forward. That is to say, the fact that the financial system has not Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 15 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2014.bmp) ![taken all necessary and possible positive econometric, scientific or legal measures to guarantee full compliance of the European Constitutional Contract and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes them particularly liable for all consequences. The duty to clarifi,• the definition of money producing a univocal, technical and legal definition of money is directly related to the obligation to mediate unequivocal communication between all direct or indirect participants of public and private contracts. This is a fundamental principle of procedural equality and transparency with respect to determining the true of all parties to the contract as well as to other affected parties. Once again we invoke the wise lessons of Nuno Manuel Pinto de Oliveira [26] regarding the duty to clarifi,• according to the following sine-qua-non presumptions: symmetry of information; relevance of information; and, finally, full disclosure. Asymmetric information is a common problem in legal transactions in the way that at least one of the contractual parties — whether public or private — knows or should know determined circumstances that the target group or co-contractor does not or cannot know. Thus, it is imperative that all parties to money contracts use a valid common definition of money not only in order to guarantee the principles of symmetry, relevance and full disclosure of information, but also to determine the validity and scope of the contracts. This is particularly essential when any lack of information significantly benefits certain parties to the detriment of other parties. Full disclosure of information regarding the exact nature of money is vital with regards to the correct formation, execution and interpretation of current public and private contracts, in order to determine accurate and equitable consideration of all circumstances. At the same time, the duty of the parties to cooperate in obtaining symmetry of information is a pre-contractual obligation that all parties must assume in order to safeguard just common human ends inherent to contracts. Finally, the violation of — either — symmetry, relevance or full disclosure is sufficient to render a contract invalid. The same is true with regard to the duty of information in the cases where contract parties don't furnish fundamental dates to the just evaluation of the contrads ends or legal scope. Therefore, the mere lack of a clear, unambiguous definition of money is sufficient to render all current contracts null and void. The importance of a universal and Constitutional definition of money to fundamental human rights It is worth repeating the wise words of Narayana R. Kocherlakota[8]: "Monetary economics has traditionally been dominated by the question of how the quantity of money, or the growth rate of that quantity, affects prices and quantities of goods. My reasoning here suggests that this focus is misplaced. Money is a record-keeping device; hence, monetary policy should be designed so that record- keeping is performed in the most efficient way possible. How do we do that?' Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 16 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2015.bmp) ![All citizens should have the right to see enshrined in the European Constitution or in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in a clear and unambiguous manner, a logically consistent legal definition of money. Otherwise, we run the risk of perpetuating unsound economic principles that undermine the Democratic Rule of Law and a dubious tax and legal system. [27] Establishing a clear, unequivocal legal definition of money in so far as currently, money represents a universal requirement for the effective and equitable exercise of all other rights, particularly the right to self determination, is indeed of the highest order to be cited in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in order to promote optimal conditions for stability and well-being, peaceful and amicable relations among all nations and maximum respect for the dignity of all citizens. It is also the first minimum and necessary step towards resolving many economic, social, legal, cultural, educational and health problems affecting the globe as required by Article 55 of the United Nations Charter that strives towards universal respect and observance of all fundamental human rights and freedoms. Currently, access to money is not in tandem with the ability for people to mutually reciprocate goods and services but, rather access is dominated by what are called "financial" assets ($600T) vs. true assets ("accumulated tangible and non tangible assets" i.e. real goods and services ($210T)[28], such that currently, money predominately represents its own value beyond representing the value of goods and services that are the true foundation of the economy. Therefore, we need to redefine a new ethic in money by adopting Kelsen's lesson: "The statement that an individual "ought to" behave in a certain way implies neither that some other individual "wills" or "commands" so, nor that the individual who ought to behave in a certain way actually behaves in this way. The norm is the expression of the idea that something ought to occur, especially that an individual ought to behave in a certain way. By the norm, nothing is said about the actual behaviour of the individual concerned. The statement that an individual "ought to " behave in a certain way means that this behaviour is prescribed by a norm — it may be a moral or a legal norm or some other norm. The "ought" simply expresses the specific sense in which human behaviour is determined by a norm. All we can do to describe this sense is to state that it is different from the sense in which we say that an individual actually behaves in a certain way, that something actually occurs or exists. A statement to the effect that something ought to occur is a statement about the existence and the contents of a norm, not a statement about natural reality, i.e. actual events in nature. (.„) The efficacy of law, understood in the last - mentioned way, consists in the fact that men are led to observe the conduct required by a norm by their idea of this norm. A statement concerning the efficacy of law so understood is a statement about actual behaviour. To designate both the valid norm and the idea of the norm, which is a psychological fact, by the same word "norm" is to commit an equivocation which may give rise to gravefallacies. " [29] The Kelsen vision does not state that (in)valid standards of positive law may be subject to the standards of justice, but recognizes that these standards of justice determine the conduct of those — e.g. legislators, administrators, entrepreneurs, bankers — whose acts Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 17 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2016.bmp) ![create the need for Law. And those acts are naturally subject to the rule of justice and to the values and general principles of international law. The fact that in the present financial, monetary and legal system, money discharges social and economic power requires that fairness in terms of money be safeguarded. However, the adoption a clear objective common understanding of the true nature of money, liberates all to act in direct consequence of that understanding, thus supporting the independence of the Judiciary and therefore the principle of separation of powers. When it becomes clear that currency has never had intrinsic value - but such as with Law, defined as a tool, to better organizing human activity - we will then be able to look with greater certainty towards restructuring the poorest nations and overcoming challenges without the need to resort to international disputes and conflicts that in any case do not successfully resolve such issues. This, in light of Recent studies that demonstrate, that for the first time in history, it is possible to eradicate poverty globally. [30] Thus, we propose a new financial system that recognises the fact that for there to be Justice in public and private financial matters, a sound "measure of value" is sine-qua- non and precludes that the unit of measure be itself a commodity of variable and negotiable value, built on the idea of money as nothing more than a record - keeping device as Kocherlakota suggests. Moreover, this proposal should be communicated to and overseen by, the public at large. Discussion and Conclusion We have established that to date and throughout history there exists no formal logically valid definition or theorem defining money, although it is made evident that the attempt has always been to seek a universal representation of value. We show via formal semantic analysis how, in order to be consistent with itself, the current de facto intensional definition of money as a "store of value", "medium of exchange" and "unit of account", must reduce to: Money: A record of a measure of value. In as much as the notion of a record of a measure of value is consistent with the notion of "mnemonic tool", this finding corroborates Kocherlakota's results regarding moneys technological function as "'social memory', with the distinction of requiring measure explicitly while in Kocherlakota's findings, such is only implicit i.e. there can only be "memory of transactions" if and only if there is measure. In any case, both findings serve to dismiss the validity of the currently commonly assumed definition of money. We then show that if money is generated by transactions as a record (annotation) OF the value of goods/services being transacted as described by the Bank of England [11] [12], then that record cannot be assigned INDEPENDENT value in and of itself. We also demonstrate for the transaction of any good or service G: Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 18 ](Disparate%20Definitions%20of%20Money%2017.bmp)   ![References: [I] "The Code of Hammurabi" translated by L.W. King, @ 2008 Lillian Goldman Law Library, 127 Wall Street, New Haven, CT 06511. [2] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book V , S. 350 BCE, The Internet Classics Archive by Daniel C. Stevenson, Web Atomics. World Wide Web presentation is copyright [C) 1994-2000, Daniel C. Stevenson, Web Atomics. [3] Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations CHAPTER V "Of the Real and Nominal Price of Commodities, or their Price in Labour, and their Price m Money", 1776. [4] David Ricardo (1772-1823), On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 1821, Chap. I "On Value". [S] William Stanley levons (1876), Money and the Mechanism of Exchange (New York: D. Appleton and Co. [6] Irving Fisher, The Purchasing Power of Money Its Determination and Relation to Credit, Interest, and crises, 1911. [7] John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. [8] Narayana R. Kocherlakota, The Technological Role of Fiat Money* Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [9] Montague, Richard. 1974. English as a formal language. In Richmond H. Thomason (ed.), Formal philosophy, pp. 188-221. New Haven: Yale University Press [10] Oxford Dictionaries wwwnxfnrddirtnnnaripernm [Il] Michael McLeay, Amar Radia, Ryland Thomas, Money in the modern economy: available at: *intra.gdf pp.1-2. [12] Michael McLeay, Amar Radia, Ryland Thomas, Money in the modern economy: available at: p. 25. [13] Marc Gauvm, "Mane*' CnmmndlO.' or MeaR11re Nnt Rath rev. Aug. @ 2015 v.ww.bibocurrency.com [14] Passive BIBO Currency Project @2013, Gauvm, Sergio Dominguez. Editors: Marc [IS] Marc Gauvin and Sergio Currency IInitThenrpm " @ 2011 [16] Sergio Dominguez, Marc Gauvin, "FnrmRI Stahjli%' AnRIysiR af rmmmnn Lending [17] Marc Gauvin, The Money PSYOP Copyright@ November 2012 All Rights Reserved h ttD' / rren 20M nn 2 n PSYO Inruyodf [18] Gustav Radbruch, Philosophy Law (titulo original: Rechstphilosophie), Arménio Amado, Coimbra, 1979, pages. 163-164; Robert Alexy, Concetto e validitÅ del diritto (original title: Begriff und Geltung des Rechts), Einaudi, Torino, 1997, pages 17 and seq. [19] Nuno Manuel Pinto Oliveira, "The principle of good faith as an empty formula?, Comment to the article of Martijn Hesselmk": in Scientia Juridica, October — December of 2007, pp. 719-732 [20] James Gordley, Equality in Exchange available in California Law Review, wyl. 69 (1981), pp. 1587 1656 [I S] [21] Irving Fisher, The Money Illusion, ADELPHI Company, New York 1928, pp. 105-106. [22] Marc Gauvin " 21/6/2015 (c) 4/3/2014 rev. [23] Lisbon Court of Appeal Decision produced on the 19th of July 2013 available in btu://www.rigsiut Ruling of the Portuguese Constitutional Court n.e 353/2012 Republic Journal, 1.2 Series, 140, on the 20th July 2012; Also see Portuguese Author J.J. Gomes Canotllho, Constitutional Law and Constitution Theory, 4.2 edition, pages 981and seq. [24] Dr. Rory O'Connell, Substantive Equality m the European Court of Human Rights, 107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 129 (2015), available at http•//reoo•itnry.luv.umjrh-edn/mlr /4/ [2 S] Delft AS v. Estonia (application no. 64569/09, the " [26] Nuno Manuel Pinto Oliveira, Principles of Contract Law, Coimbra, Coimbra, Editora, 2011, p. 189. [27] Article 103.2 rd , number 3 of the Portuguese Constitution that expresses the idea that nobody or no one can be obliged to pay taxes that weren't created in the terms of the Constitution. [28] "National statistics; International Monetary Fund; OECD; Bain Macro Trends Group analysis, 2012 via 2012 Bain Report "A World Awash in Money" at: p.7. [29] Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 1960. [30] Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: The End of Poverty: How We Can Make it Happen in Our Lifetime, Brazilian Version, translated by Pedro Maia Soares, Säo Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2005. Marc Gauvin, Jorge Meira Costa Copyright @ September 2015 21 ] ![[Marc Gauvin - Page 4.bmp]]