# The U.S.-Israel Intelligence Interface: A Comprehensive Analysis of Espionage, Influence, and Strategic Partnership ## Introduction This report provides a comprehensive examination of the multifaceted intelligence and influence activities conducted by or on behalf of the State of Israel within the United States. It navigates the central paradox of the U.S.-Israel relationship: an unparalleled strategic, military, and intelligence partnership that coexists with a history of persistent and aggressive Israeli espionage and influence operations targeting American interests. The analysis will dissect this dynamic by exploring both clandestine operations and overt political campaigns, demonstrating how these two seemingly contradictory threads are woven into a single, complex tapestry that has profound implications for U.S. national security, foreign policy autonomy, and domestic civil liberties. ## Part I: Covert Operations and Clandestine Intelligence Gathering This part details the history and evolution of Israeli covert operations in the U.S., from classic human intelligence and software theft to the modern era of sophisticated cyber warfare and supply-chain attacks. ### Section 1: The PROMIS Affair: Weaponizing Software at the Highest Levels One of the most complex and consequential intelligence scandals of the 20th century, the PROMIS affair illustrates a template of leveraging U.S. technology and co-opting high-level individuals for global espionage. #### The Inslaw Case: Theft and Fraud at the U.S. Department of Justice The Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS) was a [sophisticated case-management software originally developed in the 1970s](https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/44759NCJRS.pdf) by a non-profit, the Institute for Law and Social Research (INSLAW), with funding from the U.S. Department of Justice's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Its purpose was to help [prosecutors' offices track their massive caseloads](https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/prosecutors-management-and-information-system-promis-new-orleans-1979-45f45). After the LEAA was dissolved in the early 1980s, the [[Hamilton]] family, who ran [[Inslaw]], created a for-profit successor company and developed a significantly ["enhanced," privately financed version](https://ia601309.us.archive.org/23/items/TheInslawAffair/Chapter%2017%20-%20The%20Inslaw%20Affair.pdf) of PROMIS. In 1982, the [[DOJ]] awarded [[Inslaw]] a $10 million contract to install an older, public-domain version of PROMIS in U.S. Attorneys' offices. However, according to multiple subsequent court findings and a lengthy House Judiciary Committee investigation, the [[DOJ]] then engaged in [a systematic campaign to steal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inslaw) the proprietary, enhanced version of the software. The investigation, detailed in a report titled ["The Inslaw Affair,"](https://ia601309.us.archive.org/23/items/TheInslawAffair/Chapter%2017%20-%20The%20Inslaw%20Affair.pdf) along with two federal court rulings, concluded that "the Department of Justice acted willfully and fraudulently" and "took, converted and stole" [[Inslaw]]'s enhanced PROMIS software by "trickery, fraud and deceit". [[DOJ]] officials withheld payments, [driving Inslaw into Chapter 11 bankruptcy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inslaw) in [[February 1985]], and then illegally copied and installed the stolen software in dozens of additional U.S. Attorneys' offices without permission or compensation. #### The Israeli "Trap Door": Modifying a U.S. Government Tool for Global Espionage The [[DOJ]]'s theft of PROMIS was allegedly not just for its own use. [Sworn affidavits from individuals with ties to the intelligence community](https://ia601309.us.archive.org/23/items/TheInslawAffair/Chapter%2017%20-%20The%20Inslaw%20Affair.pdf), including former Israeli intelligence officer [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], claimed that the stolen software was modified with a "trap door" or "backdoor". This covert modification, allegedly engineered by Israeli intelligence, allowed for the secret exfiltration of data from any computer system on which the bugged software was installed. This transformed a simple case-management tool into a powerful, clandestine intelligence-gathering platform, a digital Trojan horse capable of penetrating the most sensitive computer systems in the world. #### The Role of Robert Maxwell: Media Tycoon as Mossad's Global Distributor The primary global distributor of this weaponized software was allegedly [[Robert Maxwell]], [the flamboyant British media tycoon](https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/who-is-ghislaine-maxwells-father-robert-maxwell-alleged-spy-for-israel-uk-and-russia-8938577). [[Maxwell]], who had [known links to Israel's Mossad](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Maxwell), Britain's MI6, and the Soviet KGB, used his vast international business empire and his personal relationships with world leaders as cover for these transactions. He is alleged to have [sold the compromised version of PROMIS](https://kclibrary.bibliocommons.com/v2/record/S120C257904) to dozens of foreign governments, intelligence agencies, and major financial institutions, giving Israeli intelligence a backdoor into their systems. [[Maxwell]]'s life ended as controversially as he lived it. In [[November 1991]], he disappeared from his yacht off the Canary Islands and was found dead, [floating in the ocean](https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/who-is-ghislaine-maxwells-father-robert-maxwell-alleged-spy-for-israel-uk-and-russia-8938577). While the official cause was ruled an accidental drowning due to a heart attack, some investigative authors argue that he was [assassinated by Mossad after attempting to blackmail the agency](https://www.publishersweekly.com/9780786710782) to cover the hundreds of millions of pounds he had embezzled from his own companies' pension funds. [[Maxwell]] was given a [state funeral in Israel](https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/who-is-ghislaine-maxwells-father-robert-maxwell-alleged-spy-for-israel-uk-and-russia-8938577), attended by the prime minister and multiple high-level intelligence officials, an honor that underscored his deep ties to the state. #### Penetration of U.S. Nuclear Labs and the Global Impact The most alarming allegation in the PROMIS affair is that [[Maxwell]] successfully [sold the bugged Israeli version of the software](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Maxwell) back to the United States, specifically to Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory—two of the nation's most critical nuclear research and national security facilities. This sale was allegedly facilitated by former U.S. Senator [[John Tower]], who at the time was the powerful Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. The PROMIS affair demonstrates a pattern of state-sponsored intelligence operations that rely on the corruption and co-option of insiders within a target nation. The operation's success did not hinge on a brilliant external hack but on the exploitation of internal malfeasance within the U.S. Department of Justice itself, which [federal courts found had acted](https://ia601309.us.archive.org/23/items/TheInslawAffair/Chapter%2017%20-%20The%20Inslaw%20Affair.pdf) "willfully and fraudulently" against a U.S. company. This internal vulnerability created the opportunity for a foreign intelligence service to acquire a U.S. asset, weaponize it, and then, in an act of supreme audacity, sell it back into the most secure corners of the U.S. government. This represents a far deeper and more systemic security breach than a simple theft. Furthermore, the scandal established a template for leveraging the private sector for deniable state intelligence operations. By using a private citizen ([[Maxwell]]) and a commercial product (PROMIS), the Israeli government could conduct massive global espionage with a layer of plausible deniability. This model, which allows the state to achieve its intelligence objectives while maintaining official distance, can be seen as the direct ideological and operational precursor to the modern Israeli commercial spyware industry. ### Section 2: Agents on the Ground: A History of Espionage in America Beyond software theft, Israel has a long and documented history of running human intelligence (HUMINT) operations in the United States, recruiting American citizens to penetrate sensitive government and civil society organizations. #### The Pollard Case: A Deep Breach of U.S. Naval Intelligence In one of the most damaging espionage cases in U.S. history, [[Jonathan Pollard]], a civilian U.S. Navy intelligence analyst, was [arrested in 1985 after being caught spying for Israel](https://adst.org/2016/08/friends-spy-friends-case-jonathan-pollard/). Over a 17-month period, [[Pollard]] provided his Israeli handlers with an enormous volume of highly classified material in exchange for payment, [estimated to be over 800 classified documents](https://adst.org/2016/08/friends-spy-friends-case-jonathan-pollard/). The intelligence he compromised was exceptionally sensitive, including the National Security Agency's ten-volume manual on how the U.S. gathers signals intelligence and, reportedly, [the names of thousands of individuals cooperating with U.S. intelligence agencies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan_Pollard). After being discovered, [[Pollard]] and his wife sought asylum at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C., but were [turned away by guards and arrested by the FBI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan_Pollard) waiting outside. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life in prison, an unusually severe sentence for spying on behalf of an allied nation, which reflected [the immense damage U.S. officials believed he had caused](https://adst.org/2016/08/friends-spy-friends-case-jonathan-pollard/). The sentencing judge controversially relied on a [classified memorandum from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger](https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1846&context=all_fac), which detailed the damage but was not fully available for [[Pollard]]'s defense team to rebut. Israel initially claimed the operation was a rogue endeavor but [formally acknowledged in 1998](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan_Pollard) that [[Pollard]] had been its agent. #### The Franklin Case: Blurring the Line Between Lobbying and Espionage In 2005, the line between legitimate lobbying and espionage was tested when [[Lawrence Franklin]], a Pentagon analyst specializing in Iran, was [indicted along with two senior officials](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/espionIsraelEU.pdf) from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee ([[AIPAC]]), [[Steven Rosen]] and [[Keith Weissman]]. [[Franklin]] pleaded guilty to [passing classified national defense information](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/10/6/us-official-admits-spying-for-israel), including details about U.S. policy on Iran and potential threats to U.S. forces in Iraq, to the [[AIPAC]] staffers. The indictment alleged that [[Rosen]] and [[Weissman]] then [shared this classified information](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/8/5/pro-israel-lobbyists-charged-for-spying) with Israeli officials and journalists. The case cast a harsh spotlight on [[AIPAC]]'s operations, raising questions about [whether the powerful lobby group was acting as an undeclared agent](https://acjna.org/articles/aipac-comes-under-scrutiny-as-fbi-intensifies-israeli-espionage-probe/) of a foreign government. Although [[Franklin]] was sentenced to over 12 years in prison, the Department of Justice ultimately [dropped the charges against the two AIPAC officials](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/espionIsraelEU.pdf) in 2009, a decision that fueled speculation about the political difficulties of prosecuting such a case. #### Persistent Patterns: The Ben-Ami Kadish Case and Economic Espionage The [[Pollard]] case was not an isolated incident. In 2008, the [[FBI]] arrested [[Ben-Ami Kadish]], [an 84-year-old retired U.S. Army mechanical engineer](https://acjna.org/articles/man-84-is-charged-with-spying-for-israel-in-the-1980s-rekindling-suspicions-of-an-israeli-spy-ring/). [[Kadish]] [pleaded guilty to being an unregistered agent for Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben-Ami_Kadish), admitting that from 1979 to 1985—concurrent with [[Pollard]]'s espionage—he had taken classified documents from the Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey and allowed them to be photographed by his Israeli handler. The [documents contained information on nuclear weapons](https://acjna.org/articles/man-84-is-charged-with-spying-for-israel-in-the-1980s-rekindling-suspicions-of-an-israeli-spy-ring/), the F-15 fighter jet program, and the Patriot missile system. His handler was [[Yosef Yagur]], [the same Israeli official who ran Jonathan Pollard](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben-Ami_Kadish). Despite the gravity of the breach, [[Kadish]] received no prison time and was [only fined $50,000](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben-Ami_Kadish), with the sentencing judge openly questioning why it took the government 23 years to bring charges. These cases fit into a broader, multi-decade pattern of Israeli economic and military-technical espionage against the U.S., including [the long-unresolved suspicion](https://merip.org/1986/01/israeli-spies-in-the-us/) that enriched uranium was diverted from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) plant in Pennsylvania to Israel's nuclear weapons program in the 1960s. #### Domestic Surveillance: The 1990s ADL Spying Scandal Israeli-linked intelligence gathering in the U.S. has not been limited to state secrets. In 1993, [a major scandal erupted](https://www.theguardian.com/news/article/2024/may/23/islamophobia-us-palestine-history) when it was revealed that the Anti-Defamation League ([[ADL]]) was conducting a massive, illegal domestic spying operation. The operation, centered in San Francisco, [collected information on more than 12,000 individuals](https://actionnetwork.org/events/surveillance-of-palestinian-activism-the-1993-case-of-the-adl-spy-ring-in-san-francisco/) and nearly 1,000 political groups. The targets were not foreign adversaries but [a wide array of American civil rights and activist organizations](https://actionnetwork.org/events/surveillance-of-palestinian-activism-the-1993-case-of-the-adl-spy-ring-in-san-francisco/), including the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), anti-apartheid groups, the NAACP, the American Indian Movement, and the ACLU. The [[ADL]] was accused of infiltrating these groups, collecting private information in collaboration with local police, and [selling the intelligence to foreign governments](https://imeu.org/article/explainer-the-anti-defamation-league-adl), specifically Israel and apartheid-era South Africa. In the wake of the scandal, the [[ADL]] settled a class-action lawsuit and was [placed under a permanent injunction](https://adc.org/resolution-of-adl-spy-scamdal-case/), legally barring it from engaging in such illegal spying in the future. The history of these espionage cases reveals a significant and politically influenced inconsistency in how the U.S. justice system prosecutes Israeli spying. [[Pollard]], a paid agent without a powerful domestic lobby, [received a life sentence](https://adst.org/2016/08/friends-spy-friends-case-jonathan-pollard/). The [[Franklin]] case, which directly implicated the powerful [[AIPAC]] lobby, saw [the most serious charges against the lobbyists dropped](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/8/5/pro-israel-lobbyists-charged-for-spying). [[Kadish]], whose crime was comparable to [[Pollard]]'s, was [prosecuted decades later and received a negligible sentence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben-Ami_Kadish). This disparity suggests that domestic political considerations can influence national security prosecutions, creating a permissive environment where operations entangled with influential domestic partners carry a lower risk of severe consequences. Furthermore, the [[ADL]] scandal demonstrates that Israeli-linked intelligence objectives in the U.S. extend beyond military secrets to include the monitoring and potential disruption of domestic political opposition. This represents a broader intelligence goal: to map and neutralize political dissent within the U.S. that is perceived as hostile to Israeli state interests, blurring the line between foreign intelligence collection and interference in American domestic politics. ### Section 3: The Digital Frontier: Modern Israeli Cyber-Espionage In the 21st century, espionage has transitioned to the digital realm, a domain where Israel has become a dominant global player through a state-sponsored ecosystem that fosters the creation of sophisticated cyber weapons. #### Unit 8200: The State-Sponsored Incubator for the Global Spyware Industry At the heart of Israel's cyber prowess is [[Unit 8200]], [the elite signals intelligence (SIGINT) and cyber warfare division](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QL4aKiDnE6E) of the Israel Defense Forces ([[IDF]]), often compared to the U.S. National Security Agency ([[NSA]]). The unit is primarily staffed by [young conscripts, typically 18 to 21 years old](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_8200), who are selected through a rigorous screening process and receive world-class training in hacking, code-breaking, and cyber operations. Upon completing their mandatory military service, many alumni of [[Unit 8200]] leverage their unique skills to found and staff Israel's thriving high-tech sector. This has created a [direct and symbiotic pipeline from state intelligence](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QL4aKiDnE6E) to the commercial spyware industry, with companies like NSO Group being founded by [[Unit 8200]] veterans. #### NSO Group's Pegasus: A Case Study in Proliferation and Abuse NSO Group's Pegasus spyware is [one of the most powerful surveillance tools ever created](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_\(spyware\)). Its technical capabilities are formidable, most notably its ability to execute "zero-click" infections, which can compromise a target's mobile phone without any interaction from the user, such as clicking a link. Once installed, Pegasus grants the operator [complete access to the device](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_\(spyware\)), allowing them to extract contacts, read encrypted messages from apps like WhatsApp and Signal, listen through the microphone, and watch through the camera, all without the owner's knowledge. While NSO Group claims its products are sold only to vetted governments to fight crime and terrorism, investigations have repeatedly shown [the tool being used by authoritarian and democratic regimes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_\(spyware\)) alike to target journalists, human rights activists, and political dissidents. This includes the targeting of U.S. government officials. In 2021, it was revealed that [Pegasus was discovered on the iPhones](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_\(spyware\)) of at least 11 U.S. State Department employees stationed in Uganda, demonstrating that American personnel are not immune to targeting by NSO's clients. The threat posed by Pegasus was so significant that the [[FBI]] secretly purchased the spyware in 2019 and reportedly [considered using it for domestic surveillance operations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_\(spyware\)), though it ultimately decided against its deployment. This secret acquisition reveals a serious interest within U.S. law enforcement in obtaining these foreign-made tools. In a subsequent policy reversal, the U.S. Department of Commerce [added NSO Group to its "Entity List"](https://knightcolumbia.org/blog/spyware-company-nso-group-faces-setbacks-in-attempts-to-avoid-us-lawsuits) in 2021, effectively blacklisting the company for engaging in activities contrary to the national security interests of the United States. #### Paragon and the Next Wave: The Continued Integration of Israeli Spyware into U.S. Agencies Despite the blacklisting of NSO Group, the demand for Israeli spyware within the U.S. government persists. Paragon Solutions, [another Israeli firm founded by a former commander of Unit 8200](https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/usa-government-backtracks-on-commitment-to-avoid-working-with-spyware-companies-linked-to-human-rights-abuse/), developed a similar tool called Graphite. In 2025, it was reported that [U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had quietly reactivated](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/sep/02/trump-immigration-ice-israeli-spyware) a $2 million contract to acquire Paragon's spyware. The contract had been paused under the Biden administration due to an executive order limiting the federal use of commercial spyware that poses human rights or counterintelligence risks. The reactivation appears to have been made possible after [Paragon was acquired by a U.S.-based private equity firm](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/sep/02/trump-immigration-ice-israeli-spyware), a move that may have been designed to circumvent the executive order's restrictions on foreign-owned tools. The Israeli commercial spyware industry represents the privatization and globalization of the model first seen in the PROMIS affair. State-trained experts from [[Unit 8200]] create private companies that sell state-level surveillance tools, with the Israeli government licensing their export and using them as a form of diplomatic leverage. This creates a global surveillance ecosystem where Israel benefits financially and diplomatically, all under the guise of commercial enterprise. This dynamic creates a significant counterintelligence paradox for the United States. The U.S. is simultaneously a target of these tools, as seen with the State Department hacks, and a customer, as evidenced by the [[FBI]] and [[ICE]] contracts. This creates a dependency on a foreign power for critical surveillance technology that could contain undisclosed vulnerabilities. The U.S. is effectively outsourcing a core national security function to companies deeply intertwined with a foreign intelligence service that has a documented history of spying on America, creating a profound strategic vulnerability. ### Section 4: The Technology of Targeted Force Beyond intelligence collection, Israel has demonstrated a unique and highly advanced capability for conducting physically destructive attacks through unconventional technological means, showcasing a mastery of targeted force projection. #### The 2024 Pager Bombings: An Operational Analysis of Supply-Chain Warfare In a stunningly coordinated operation on [[September 17, 2024]], [thousands of pagers carried by Hezbollah members and affiliates](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nowhere-hide-israels-pager-attacks-hezbollah) in Lebanon and Syria simultaneously detonated. The attacks killed at least 11 people and injured over 2,000, including senior Hezbollah officials and the Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon. The operation was not a remote software hack but [a sophisticated supply-chain interdiction](https://lieber.westpoint.edu/well-it-depends-explosive-pagers-attack-revisited/). According to reports, Israeli intelligence infiltrated the procurement process for a batch of 5,000 pagers that Hezbollah had recently ordered. Operating through [a shell corporation in Hungary named B.A.C. Consulting](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/18/how-did-hezbollah-get-the-pagers-that-exploded-in-lebanon), which had licensed the right to manufacture pagers from the Taiwanese company Gold Apollo, Israeli agents produced or tampered with the devices before they reached Hezbollah. [A small amount of the powerful and difficult-to-detect explosive PETN](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/18/how-did-hezbollah-get-the-pagers-that-exploded-in-lebanon) was integrated into each pager, likely within the battery compartment. The explosives were designed to detonate upon receiving a specific encrypted signal sent over the pager network, a signal that was reportedly [triggered when users pressed two buttons](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/18/how-did-hezbollah-get-the-pagers-that-exploded-in-lebanon) to view a message. The explosive charge was reportedly [calibrated to be just large enough](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIWjFlX7TBw) to injure or kill the user without causing significant collateral damage to those nearby. #### Precedents in Assassination Technology: The Yahya "The Engineer" Ayyash Cell Phone Bomb The 2024 pager attack was a scaled-up version of a technique Israel had pioneered decades earlier. In 1996, Israel's internal security service, Shin Bet, [assassinated Yahya Ayyash](https://israeled.org/phone-bomb-kills-terrorist-yahya-ayyash/), Hamas's chief bomb-maker known as "The Engineer". Israeli intelligence used a collaborator within [[Ayyash]]'s inner circle to gain temporary access to his Motorola cell phone. The device was [rigged with 11 grams of explosives](https://idsf.org.il/en/history-en/deadly-attacks/) and returned to him. Agents monitored his calls and, after confirming his identity via voice recognition when he placed his weekly call to his father, [remotely detonated the phone](https://israeled.org/phone-bomb-kills-terrorist-yahya-ayyash/), killing him instantly. This operation established a clear precedent for [weaponizing personal communication devices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Israeli_assassinations) for targeted assassinations. #### Stuxnet: The U.S.-Israeli Cyberweapon that Redefined Modern Warfare Israel has also partnered with the United States to develop and deploy physically destructive digital weapons. The Stuxnet computer worm, which was discovered in 2010, was [the product of a joint U.S.-Israeli operation](https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/stuxnet) designed to sabotage Iran's nuclear program. The highly sophisticated malware specifically targeted the industrial control systems at Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility, causing centrifuges to spin out of control and self-destruct while feeding normal operating data back to the facility's controllers. Stuxnet was [the first publicly known cyberattack to cause physical damage](https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/stuxnet) in the real world, representing a watershed moment in the history of modern warfare. While an example of U.S.-Israeli cooperation, it demonstrates the exceptional level of technical prowess both nations possess in this domain. These operations reveal a doctrine of "technological assassination" and supply-chain warfare that blurs the lines between espionage, military action, and terrorism. The pager attack was not a conventional military strike but a mass-casualty event executed through covert means, subverting a global commercial supply chain to achieve a military objective. This is a strategic capability that few other nations possess. The technical sophistication required for such an attack implies an intelligence penetration of the target's logistics, procurement, and communications security that is virtually total. To execute the pager bombing, Israeli intelligence needed to know precisely which pager model Hezbollah would order, the intermediaries involved, and the entire supply route from Asia to Europe to the Middle East, and then physically intercept and modify thousands of devices without detection. This level of foresight and access suggests a complete compromise of Hezbollah's operational security. ### Section 5: Deconstructing Public Theories This section addresses lesser-known theories of Israeli spying, such as the "toy helicopters in shopping malls" theory, by grounding them in documented, factual events that may have served as their origin. #### The "Toy Helicopters in Shopping Malls" Theory A persistent theory circulating in online forums alleges that Israeli intelligence operatives used toy helicopters or small drones for surveillance inside U.S. shopping malls. While there is [no direct evidence to support this specific claim](https://aerospaceweb.org/design/helicopter/history.shtml) of airborne surveillance devices, the theory did not emerge from a vacuum. It is likely a distorted interpretation of a series of real, documented federal law enforcement investigations into large-scale criminal enterprises run by Israeli nationals in U.S. malls. Beginning in the 2010s, federal authorities uncovered and prosecuted [several extensive immigration fraud and money laundering schemes](https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/israeli-owner-mall-kiosk-businesses-pleads-guilty-immigration-and-money-laundering) centered on networks of mall kiosks operated by Israelis. These operations typically involved recruiting young, recently discharged [[IDF]] soldiers in Israel, bringing them to the United States on fraudulent B-2 tourist visas (which do not permit employment), and putting them to work selling products like Dead Sea cosmetics or skincare items from kiosks in malls across the country. One such network, [known collectively as RASKO](https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/israeli-owner-mall-kiosk-businesses-pleads-guilty-immigration-and-money-laundering), recruited over 140 foreign nationals and, between 2012 and 2014, laundered over $14 million in sales through a complex scheme that routed money back to Israel. In another case, [an indictment against an Israeli national](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-extradited-charged-in-us-for-running-illegal-kiosk-network/) for running a similar network in Maryland and Virginia was unsealed in 2023. The existence of these widespread, centrally organized, and illegal commercial networks—staffed by foreign nationals in highly public spaces—created a factual "kernel of truth" that could easily fuel public suspicion and morph into more elaborate, though unsubstantiated, theories about espionage involving drones or toy helicopters. The core truth is the documented presence of suspicious, Israeli-run networks operating within U.S. malls. ## Part II: Overt Influence and the Political-Legal Landscape This part shifts focus from covert actions to the overt, legal, and political mechanisms through which pro-Israel interests influence U.S. policy and public discourse. ### Section 6: AIPAC and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) A central element of pro-Israel influence in the U.S. is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee ([[AIPAC]]), one of Washington's most powerful lobbying organizations. Its legal status, particularly concerning the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), is a subject of ongoing controversy. #### FARA Explained: The Legal Framework for Foreign Influence Enacted in 1938 primarily to counter Nazi propaganda, FARA requires [individuals or entities that engage in political or advocacy work](https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2018/01/the-foreign-agents-registration-act-fara) in the U.S. "at the order, request, or under the direction or control" of a "foreign principal" to register with the Department of Justice. A foreign principal can be [a foreign government, political party, or organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Agents_Registration_Act). FARA is a transparency law; it does not prohibit lobbying for foreign interests but [mandates public disclosure](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10499) of the relationship, activities, and finances involved. #### AIPAC's Unique Status: Arguments For and Against Registration [[AIPAC]] has never registered under FARA. The organization maintains that it is [a domestic American lobby group](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIPAC), funded by American donors, that advocates for policies it believes are in the best interest of the United States, namely a strong U.S.-Israel relationship. However, critics argue that [[AIPAC]] functions as an undeclared agent of the Israeli government and should be required to register. This argument is based on several key points: **Historical Precedent:** [[AIPAC]]'s direct predecessor, the American Zionist Council (AZC), was [formally ordered by the Kennedy administration's Department of Justice](https://www.trackaipac.com/blog/aipac-fara) in 1962 to register under FARA after an investigation revealed it was receiving funds from the Jewish Agency in Israel to conduct lobbying activities in Congress. Rather than register, the AZC's director, [[Isaiah Kenen]], dissolved the lobbying arm and reconstituted it the following year as [[AIPAC]], funded by American donors—a move critics contend was a direct maneuver to evade the FARA order. **Evidence of Coordination:** The 2005 [[Lawrence Franklin]] espionage case, in which [senior AIPAC officials were indicted](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/espionIsraelEU.pdf) for receiving classified U.S. information and allegedly passing it to Israeli officials, demonstrated a level of coordination and alignment of interests that appears to go far beyond traditional domestic lobbying. Furthermore, [leaked Israeli government documents](https://www.trackaipac.com/blog/aipac-fara) have revealed internal concerns in Jerusalem that [[AIPAC]]'s advocacy could trigger FARA scrutiny, prompting discussions about concealing their ties. #### A Comparative Look: FARA Scrutiny of Other Organizations The debate over [[AIPAC]]'s status is often contrasted with the scrutiny faced by other advocacy groups. The Council on American-Islamic Relations ([[CAIR]]), for example, has [faced persistent accusations and calls](https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/cairobservatory/) from critics to register under FARA due to its alleged ties to foreign entities. A [search of the public FARA database](https://efile.fara.gov/ords/fara/f?p=1235:10) does not show an active registration for [[CAIR]]. The disparity in the level of official enforcement pressure and public discourse between [[AIPAC]] and organizations like [[CAIR]] raises questions about whether FARA is applied equitably or if a de facto special privilege exists for lobbies representing certain allied nations. [[AIPAC]]'s non-registration under FARA is arguably the single most important factor enabling its unique power. FARA registration carries a political stigma; being labeled a "foreign agent" can diminish a lobby's influence by framing its agenda as [serving external rather than domestic interests](https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2018/01/the-foreign-agents-registration-act-fara). By avoiding this designation, [[AIPAC]] can present its policy goals—which consistently align with those of the incumbent Israeli government—as organic, American-led priorities. This legal status is not a mere technicality but the foundational pillar of its influence strategy. The persistent non-enforcement of FARA in this case, despite historical precedent and evidence of coordination, suggests that the "special relationship" with Israel extends beyond policy and into the realm of domestic U.S. law enforcement and regulatory discretion. ### Section 7: Legislating Allegiance: Anti-Boycott Laws and Constitutional Rights In recent years, pro-Israel advocacy has translated into a nationwide campaign to enact state and federal laws penalizing boycotts of Israel, raising significant First Amendment questions. #### The Proliferation of State-Level Anti-BDS Laws As of 2024, [38 U.S. states have adopted laws or executive orders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-BDS_laws) designed to counter the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions ([[BDS]]) movement, a Palestinian-led campaign to put economic pressure on Israel. These laws, heavily promoted by lobbying groups such as the Israel Allies Foundation ([[IAF]]), typically take one of two forms: either mandating state pension funds to divest from companies that boycott Israel, or, more commonly, [requiring individuals and companies that contract with the state](https://justvision.org/boycott/legislation-tracker) to sign a pledge, or "loyalty oath," certifying that they are not and will not engage in a boycott of Israel for the duration of the contract. #### First Amendment Under Fire: Legal Challenges These laws have been met with a wave of legal challenges from the American Civil Liberties Union ([[ACLU]]) and other civil rights organizations. The lawsuits, filed in states including Kansas, Arizona, Arkansas, and Texas, argue that [the laws violate the First Amendment right](https://legislation.palestinelegal.org/legal-challenges-to-anti-boycott-laws/) to participate in political boycotts. This right was constitutionally affirmed in the 1982 Supreme Court case [[NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.]], which [protected a civil rights boycott](https://www.aclu.org/news/free-speech/laws-suppressing-boycotts-israel-dont-prevent-discrimination-they-violate-civil) of white-owned businesses in Mississippi. Federal courts have delivered conflicting rulings. District courts in Kansas, Arizona, and Texas have [blocked their respective state laws](https://www.aclu.org/news/free-speech/aclu-files-second-lawsuit-challenging-laws-suppressing-boycotts), finding them to be an unconstitutional infringement on free speech. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the Arkansas law. The Supreme Court [declined to hear the appeal](https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/supreme-court-declines-to-review-challenge-to-law-restricting-israel-boycotts) in that case, leaving the legal question unresolved at the national level and allowing such laws to remain in effect in several states. #### The FEMA Funding Controversy: A Federal Extension of Anti-BDS Policy The principle behind these state laws was extended to the federal level in [[August 2025]], when reports emerged that the Trump administration had [included a clause in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant notices](https://gvwire.com/2025/08/04/us-links-1-9-billion-in-state-disaster-funds-to-israel-boycott-stance/). The clause required state and local governments to certify that they do not boycott Israeli companies as a condition for receiving at least $1.9 billion in federal disaster preparedness funds. This move to condition essential, life-saving aid on a specific foreign policy stance [sparked immediate and widespread backlash](https://www.newsweek.com/israel-boycotts-donald-trump-maga-response-fema-2108785), including from conservative supporters of the administration who argued it represented an "Israel First" policy at the expense of "America First". In response to the public outcry, the Department of Homeland Security ([[DHS]]) [quickly removed the explicit reference to "Israel"](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/antisemitism-fema-no-longer-requires-states-to-oppose-israel-boycotts-dhs-confirms/articleshow/123125909.cms) from the grant documents. However, [[DHS]] officials maintained that the agency would still enforce anti-discrimination policies related to the [[BDS]] movement, which a spokesperson described as "expressly grounded in antisemitism". Anti-[[BDS]] laws represent an outsourcing of foreign policy enforcement to state and local governments. They use the power of the state purse to compel private U.S. citizens—from teachers and engineers to writers—to align with a specific foreign policy position as a condition of earning a livelihood. The FEMA controversy revealed the potential endpoint of this legislative trend: the conditioning of essential federal services on ideological compliance. While reversed, the attempt demonstrated a willingness to leverage even critical public safety funding to enforce a political viewpoint, highlighting the immense power of the lobby behind these laws. ### Section 8: Identity, Law, and Allegiance Central to the U.S.-Israel relationship are complex legal and conceptual frameworks surrounding dual citizenship and the definition of antisemitism, both of which have become highly politicized. #### Dual U.S.-Israeli Citizenship: Legal Frameworks and Implications Both the United States and Israel [permit their citizens to hold dual nationality](https://lawoffice.org.il/en/dual-citizenship-for-israelis/). Under Israel's Law of Return, [any Jew who immigrates to Israel](https://www.multiplecitizenship.com/wscl/ws_ISRAEL.html) (makes aliyah) is automatically entitled to citizenship and is not required to renounce their previous nationality. This policy is designed to encourage diaspora Jews to move to Israel without losing their original citizenship. In contrast, [non-Jews who wish to become naturalized Israeli citizens](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_citizenship_law) are generally required to renounce their foreign nationalities. The existence of a large population of dual U.S.-Israeli citizens, including some in positions of public trust or with access to classified information, creates a complex counterintelligence landscape. While dual citizenship is legal and common, it can raise the specter of divided loyalties, a concern that has been invoked in espionage cases and political discourse. #### The Evolving Definition of Antisemitism: From Bigotry to Political Tool Historically, antisemitism is understood as [hostility, prejudice, or discrimination directed against Jews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_antisemitism) as a religious, ethnic, or racial group. This ["longest hatred"](https://www.britannica.com/topic/antisemitism) has manifested in various forms over centuries, from the religious anti-Judaism of the Middle Ages to the pseudoscientific racial antisemitism of the 19th and 20th centuries that [culminated in the Holocaust](https://courier.unesco.org/en/articles/anti-semitism-learning-lessons-history). In recent years, this definition has become a subject of intense debate, largely due to the promotion of the "working definition of antisemitism" [adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)](https://www.palquest.org/en/highlight/38757/ihra-working-definition-antisemitism) in 2016. The core definition itself—["Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews"](https://holocaustremembrance.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/IHRA-non-legally-binding-working-definition-of-antisemitism-1.pdf)—is broadly accepted. The controversy stems from [the 11 "illustrative examples"](https://holocaustremembrance.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/IHRA-non-legally-binding-working-definition-of-antisemitism-1.pdf) that accompany it, a majority of which relate to criticism of Israel. These examples suggest that it could be antisemitic, depending on the context, to engage in actions such as "claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor" or "applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation". Numerous academics, legal scholars, and civil liberties groups have argued that [the IHRA definition is being weaponized](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IHRA_definition_of_antisemitism) to suppress free speech and delegitimize criticism of Israeli government policies, particularly concerning its treatment of Palestinians. This has led to the development of alternative definitions, such as [the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA)](https://jerusalemdeclaration.org/), which explicitly seek to create a clearer distinction between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of Israel and Zionism. The political push to have governments, universities, and other institutions formally adopt the IHRA definition is a primary tool of modern pro-Israel influence campaigns. It seeks to control the boundaries of acceptable discourse by providing an institutional framework for labeling certain forms of political speech as hate speech. This creates a powerful "chilling effect" on free speech and academic inquiry. Fearing accusations of bigotry, loss of employment, or legal challenges, individuals and institutions may self-censor, thereby narrowing the scope of public debate in the U.S. on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This serves a strategic interest by suppressing dissent without the need for direct censorship. ## Part III: Manifestations of the Strategic Partnership The covert and overt influence operations detailed in this report must be understood against the backdrop of a formal, deep, and institutionalized alliance between the United States and Israel. ### Section 9: The Formal Alliance: Military Aid and Intelligence Sharing The official U.S. commitment to Israel's security is unparalleled, forming the bedrock of the "special relationship." #### Unprecedented Military and Financial Aid Israel is [the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign aid](https://www.cfr.org/article/us-aid-israel-four-charts) since World War II. Between fiscal years 1946 and 2024, the U.S. provided Israel with nearly $300 billion in total aid (adjusted for inflation), the vast majority of which has been military assistance. This support is formalized through rolling 10-year Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). The current MOU, covering 2019-2028, [pledges $38 billion in military aid](https://www.cfr.org/article/us-aid-israel-four-charts), which breaks down to $3.3 billion per year in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and $500 million per year for joint missile defense programs. Following the Hamas attack of [[October 7, 2023]], U.S. aid surged dramatically. In the subsequent year, the U.S. [approved at least $17.9 billion in additional military aid](https://www.cfr.org/article/us-aid-israel-four-charts) to Israel through supplemental appropriations bills. |Decade|Approx. Total Military Aid (Constant 2022 USD)|Key Events & Policy Milestones| |---|---|---| |1970s|~$50 Billion|Post-Yom Kippur War (1973) airlift; start of large-scale, consistent aid packages.| |1980s|~$45 Billion|Strategic Cooperation Agreement (1981); Israel designated Major Non-NATO Ally (1987).| |1990s|~$40 Billion|First Gulf War (1991); Oslo Accords (1993); first 10-year MOU established.| |2000s|~$48 Billion|Second Intifada; Post-9/11 cooperation; Qualitative Military Edge (QME) codified into law (2008).| |2010s|~$55 Billion|Iron Dome funding begins (2011); Obama administration signs 10-year, $38 billion MOU (2016).| |2020s|>$40 Billion (as of late 2024)|Abraham Accords (2020); Post-October 7, 2023 supplemental aid packages.| #### The "Qualitative Military Edge" (QME) Doctrine A cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Israel, [codified into federal law in 2008](https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-israel), is the commitment to maintain Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). This doctrine requires the U.S. to ensure that Israel has the military and technological superiority to counter any credible conventional threat from any individual state or coalition of states in the region. In practice, this means Israel often receives access to more advanced U.S. military technology, such as the F-35 fighter jet, before other allies in the Middle East. #### Intelligence Sharing and Joint Operations Beyond financial and material support, the U.S. and Israel maintain a deeply integrated intelligence and military relationship. This is governed by [a series of formal agreements](https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-israel), including the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1952) and the General Security of Information Agreement (1982). The two countries engage in extensive intelligence sharing, joint counter-terrorism efforts, and regular, large-scale joint military exercises such as ["Juniper Cobra"](https://new.embassies.gov.il/usa/en/the-embassy/bilateral-relations). They also collaborate on the research and development of advanced military technologies, most notably [multi-layered missile defense systems](https://www.stimson.org/2023/in-shadow-of-war-a-snapshot-of-u-s-military-assistance-to-israel/) like Iron Dome, David's Sling, and the Arrow program. ### Section 10: The Politics of Unwavering Support The formal alliance is reinforced by powerful political and ideological currents within the United States that produce staunchly pro-Israel rhetoric and policies. #### Analyzing Political Rhetoric: Motivations and Messaging The unwavering support for Israel among many U.S. politicians is driven by a combination of strategic, ideological, and theological motivations. **Theological Justifications:** A significant driver, particularly within the Republican party, is Christian Zionism. Senator [[Ted Cruz]], for example, has explicitly stated that [his support for Israel is a biblical mandate](https://christiancourier.com/articles/unpacking-ted-cruzs-claim-is-supporting-modern-israel-biblically-mandated/), citing the passage in Genesis, "Those who bless Israel will be blessed and those who curse Israel will be cursed". He has argued that this biblical "Israel" is [synonymous with the modern political state](https://forward.com/fast-forward/730222/tucker-carlson-ted-cruz-interview-biblical-israel/) run by its current government. This viewpoint is a powerful motivator for a large and politically active evangelical Christian base. **Ideological Alignment:** Other officials frame the relationship in terms of a shared civilizational identity. State Department spokesperson [[Tammy Bruce]] sparked controversy in 2025 when [a clip resurfaced of her calling](https://www.jns.org/tammy-bruce-the-state-dept-spokeswoman-doesnt-mind-being-mistaken-for-a-jew/) the U.S. the "greatest country on Earth, next to Israel". She elaborated that this view is based on a shared "Judeo-Christian ethic" and a belief that it is the "responsibility of every person on this planet to recognize" why Israel and the Jewish people matter. This framing elevates support for Israel from [a strategic interest to a moral and ideological imperative](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/america-greatest-country-on-earth-next-to-israel-state-department-spokesperson-tammy-bruces-old-clip-goes-viral/articleshow/122030710.cms). **Strategic Justifications:** A long-standing argument for the alliance is that Israel serves as a vital U.S. strategic asset in a volatile region—a stable, democratic, and militarily powerful partner often referred to as [America's aircraft carrier in the Middle East](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93United_States_relations). #### Symbolic Politics: The Display of Israeli Flags This intense political alignment is often expressed through powerful symbolic gestures, such as [the display of Israeli flags](https://www.tiktok.com/@medeabenjamin/video/7311884044793417002) outside the offices of U.S. members of Congress. While supporters see this as a sign of solidarity with a key ally, critics question whether it signals a divided allegiance, suggesting [a representative's loyalty should be to their American constituents](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/nov/12/rashida-tlaib-censure-congress-palestinian-rights-gaza) alone. This debate was encapsulated in the 2025 controversy at the Beverly Hills Unified School District. The school board initially [voted 3-2 to display the Israeli flag](https://www.jns.org/days-after-voting-to-display-israeli-flags-on-jewish-heritage-month-beverly-hills-district-board-reneges/) on school campuses during Jewish American Heritage Month, arguing it was a necessary gesture of support for the Jewish community amid rising antisemitism. The decision, however, triggered intense backlash and safety concerns. Critics, including Jewish community members, argued that [the flag of a foreign nation](https://forward.com/news/766018/beverly-hills-israeli-flag-jewish/), particularly one engaged in a controversial war, was inappropriate for a public school and did not represent all Jewish people. The district superintendent ultimately [reversed the decision](https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/beverly-hills-unified-school-board-to-adopt-new-flag-policy-after-superintendent-overrules-israeli-flag-display/), citing security threats, and the board later adopted a permanent policy to fly only the U.S. and California flags, highlighting the deep divisions over the flag's meaning. ### Section 11: Influence on U.S. Education and Media Pro-Israel narratives have also been promoted through non-political channels, such as educational publishing, an example of "soft power" that can shape public opinion over generations. #### Robert Maxwell's Publishing Empire and U.S. Textbooks [[Robert Maxwell]], the same media mogul implicated in the PROMIS affair, built [a publishing empire that included Pergamon Press and Macmillan Publishers](https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/who-is-ghislaine-maxwells-father-robert-maxwell-alleged-spy-for-israel-uk-and-russia-8938577), which were major suppliers of academic journals and textbooks to American schools and universities. Throughout his career, [[Maxwell]] was a staunch Zionist, and textbooks published by his companies, particularly Pergamon Press, were often [criticized for promoting pro-Israel historical narratives](https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/who-is-ghislaine-maxwells-father-robert-maxwell-alleged-spy-for-israel-uk-and-russia-8938577). By controlling a significant share of the academic and educational publishing market, [[Maxwell]] was in a powerful position to influence the content and perspectives presented to American students. This represents a subtle but potent form of influence that operates below the level of direct political lobbying. The combination of overt political support from figures like [[Cruz]], symbolic gestures like the display of Israeli flags, powerful lobbying from groups like [[AIPAC]], and long-term influence over educational materials creates a mutually reinforcing ecosystem of pro-Israel sentiment in the United States. Each element strengthens the others, contributing to a resilient and deeply entrenched political consensus that forms the foundation of the "special relationship." ## Conclusion The interface between the United States and Israel is defined by a deep and persistent paradox. On one hand, it is a formal, institutionalized strategic partnership of unparalleled depth, underwritten by hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S. military aid, preferential access to advanced weaponry, and deeply integrated intelligence cooperation. This public alliance is reinforced by a powerful political consensus in Washington, driven by strategic, ideological, and theological motivations. On the other hand, this partnership coexists with, and in some ways enables, a long and documented history of aggressive Israeli intelligence operations against the United States. These operations have ranged from the classic recruitment of American citizens as spies to the sophisticated theft and weaponization of U.S. government software in the PROMIS affair. In the modern era, this has evolved into an industrial-scale commercial spyware industry, born from Israeli military intelligence units, whose products have been used to target U.S. government officials. Simultaneously, pro-Israel influence campaigns have reshaped the American legal and political landscape, successfully lobbying for state laws that condition public contracts on a pledge not to boycott Israel and promoting a definition of antisemitism that is used to chill criticism of Israeli government policy. The evidence presented in this report demonstrates a dynamic where the formal alliance provides both the motivation and the cover for these covert and overt operations. The perceived necessity of the strategic partnership creates a permissive environment where espionage on behalf of an "ally" is sometimes prosecuted inconsistently, and where powerful domestic lobbies can operate in a gray area of foreign influence with little regulatory scrutiny. Understanding this relationship requires moving beyond a simple "ally" or "adversary" framework. It demands a more nuanced model of a deeply enmeshed partner that simultaneously cooperates and competes—often in domains critical to U.S. national security, policy autonomy, and the constitutional rights of its citizens.