[John Searle](http://wikipedia.org/en/John_Searle) is an American philosopher and currently the Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He was born on July 31, 1932, in Denver, Colorado. Searle is best known for his contributions to the philosophy of mind and language. He is particularly famous for his argument against strong artificial intelligence, known as the Chinese Room Argument. This argument challenges the possibility of a computer truly understanding or having consciousness, even if it were able to pass the Turing Test. Throughout his career, Searle has published numerous influential works. One of his most significant books is "[[speech act theory|Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language]]" (1969), where he introduced the concept of speech acts and discussed their role in communication. Another influential work by Searle is "[[@MindsBrainsScience|Minds, Brains and Science]]" (1984), where he explored the relationship between mind, consciousness, and neuroscience. In this book, he argued that mental states are not reducible to physical states and criticized reductionist views that attempt to explain consciousness solely through brain processes. Searle has also made important contributions to social philosophy, ethics, and political theory. His work on social ontology focuses on how collective entities such as institutions or money get their meaning from individual human actions and intentions. ### Searle's Critique of Descriptivism and Causal Theories Descriptivist theories, such as those proposed by Frege and Russell, suggest that [[proper names]] are shorthand for descriptions associated with an individual. For example, "Aristotle" might be understood as "the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great." On the other hand, the causal-historical theory, primarily developed by [[Saul Kripke]], argues that a name's meaning is not tied to any specific description but rather to a historical chain of uses tracing back to an initial naming event. Searle critiques both positions for different reasons. He argues that the descriptivist theory fails because the descriptions associated with a name might not uniquely identify an individual or might be factually incorrect while still successfully referring to the right individual. For example, if someone mistakenly believed Aristotle was Plato's only student, the name "Aristotle" would still refer to Aristotle despite the incorrect description. Against the causal-historical theory, Searle raises concerns about cases where there might be a break in the chain of usage or where the use of a name in a new context fails to connect properly to the original referent. He contends that the causal chain, on its own, does not sufficiently account for how names actually succeed in referring to individuals. ### Searle's Theory: Intention and Fit Searle proposes a more nuanced theory that combines elements of descriptivism with insights from the causal-historical approach. He emphasizes the role of the speaker's intentions and the concept of "fit." According to Searle, when using a name, a speaker has an intentional state that involves a certain cluster of descriptions, which he terms the "intentional content" associated with the name. However, unlike strict descriptivism, these descriptions do not rigidly determine the referent. Instead, they must merely "fit" the object to which the name actually refers, as established through a causal link. This theory allows for the possibility that some elements of the associated description may be erroneous while still maintaining successful reference, as long as there is enough correct information to secure a "fit" between the name and its referent. Additionally, the causal history of the name's use plays a crucial role in anchoring the name to a specific individual, but it is the speaker's intention and the fulfillment of the fittingness condition that ultimately govern reference. ### Conclusion John Searle's theory of proper names thus offers a sophisticated blend of intentionality, descriptive fit, and causal history, which seeks to overcome the limitations found in both descriptivist and causal-historical theories. His approach provides a more flexible framework for understanding how names refer to objects in the world, accounting for both the mental states of language users and the social context in which names are used. In addition to his academic achievements, Searle has received numerous awards and honors throughout his career. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1975 and a member of the American Philosophical Society in 2000. John Searle's work continues to be highly influential in various fields within philosophy. His ideas have sparked debates and discussions among philosophers, cognitive scientists, linguists, and computer scientists regarding consciousness, language understanding, and [[artificial intelligence]]. # References ```dataview Table title as Title, authors as Authors where contains(authors, "John Searle") or contains(authors, "John R. Searle") or contains(subject, "John Searle") ```