# Mens Rea * "Intent to destroy the group 'as such'" * Para 551. (p. 234) - "The term 'as such' has great significance as it shows that the crime of genocide requires intent to destroy a collection of people because of their particular group identity based on nationality, race, ethnicity, or religion." * Krstic Trial Chamber * Para 552: "The Appeals Chamber in that case upheld this finding, stating that '\[t]he physical destruction of the men therefore had severe procreative implications for the Srebrenica Muslim community, potentially consigning the community to extinction." * "In whole or in part" * Para 555: "It is well established that where a conviction for genocide relies on the intent to destroy a group 'in part', such part must be a substantial part of the whole protected group. The targeted portion must be a 'significant enough \[portion] to have an impact on the group as a whole." * "... Furthermore, the area of the perpetrators' activity, control, and the possible extent of their reach should be considered." * [Para 576-580](https://www.irmct.org/sites/default/files/case_documents/210608-appeal-judgement-JUD285R0000638396-mladic-13-56-en.pdf) - Significance to survival * Count 1 Municipalities comprising 0.6 - 2.6% of Bosnia's 1.9 million Muslim seen as a "relatively small part" of the group * Srebrenica found to be substantial for qualitative reasons 1. Most Muslim inhabitants of the region had sought refuge here; "elimination of that enclave would have accomplished the goal of purifying the entire region of its Muslim population" 2. The massacre, which occurred despite international community assurances, exemplified the vulnerability of Bosnian Muslims all over the country 3. Srebrenica was one of only a few predominantly Muslim territories in *Republika Srpska* # Joint Criminal Enterprise * 560: Three forms of criminal responsibility for JCE 1. "Basic" - "All participants, acting pursuant to a common purpose, possess the same criminal intention to effectuate that purpose." 2. "Systemic" - "Organised systems of ill-treatment" 3. "Extended" - Liability for "a crime which falls outside the common purpose or design, but which is nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of effectuating that common purpose." * 561: Elements must be established 1. A plurality of persons acting with a common purpose 2. A common plan, design, or purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime 3. The participation of the accused in furthering the common design or purpose * 563: "All three forms of JCE require proof of the existence of a 'common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime...'" * 564: Though the contribution doesn't need to be that without which the crime wouldn't have been committed, the accused must "contribute to the common purpose in a way that lends a significant contribution to the crimes." * 566: "the Appeals chamber has held that the *actus reus* for 'commission by omission' is a higher standard than for aiding and abetting by omission, namely, the accused must exert 'concrete influence' on the perpetration of the crime." * 569: "Where that crime is genocide, the prosecution will be required to establish that it was reasonably foreseeable to the accused that an act specified in Article 4(2) would be committed and that it would be committed with genocidal intent." ... "In other words, the accused must have sufficient knowledge that the extended crime was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the common criminal purpose." ## Planning * 571: Accused "must have designed criminal conduct that is later carried out and which constitutes one or more crimes enumerated in the Statute... The accused must intend to plan the commission of a crime or, at a minimum, must be aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of the acts or omissions planned." ## Instigating * 572: The accused "prompts another person to commit an offence, which is actually committed. The prompt may be either express or implied, it need not be direct or public, and it may consist of either an act or an omission." * The prompting must have been "substantially contributing to the conduct of another person committing the crime" * Prosecution does not need to prove that the crime would not have been committed without the prompt ## Ordering * 573: Accused must instruct another person to engage in an act or omission. Though they need to be in a position of authority, it need not be formal. "However, there must be 'proof of some position of authority on the part of the accused that would compel another to commit a crime in following the accused's order." ## Aiding and Abetting * 575: Omissions "specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime". * 577: Requisite mental element is "knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific crime". They must be aware of the essential elements of the crime, including state of mind and relevant specific intent, even if they don't share it themselves. # Srebrenica - Para 5662: "Once taken to the execution sites, the Bosnian Muslim males must have realised that they would be killed and thus spent their last terrifying moments in a state of hopelessness. The Chamber finds that the suffering endured by these men in the final days and hours before they were killed by Bosnian Serb Forces constituted serious bodily or mental harm." - Para 5663: On those who survived, "their respective close encounters with death have had long-lasting effects on their respective abilities to lead normal and constructive lives." - Para 5664: On women, children and elderly, the mental harm caused by the deaths of men and boys in their families "had long-lasting effects" on their abilities "to live normal and constructive lives." - Para 5666: The killings and removals "were intended to ensure that the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica could not re-constitute itself." - Intent evident from the "scale of the killings", "level of coordination", "systematic method through which they were carried out" ## Intent to destroy - Para 5668: Consistent pattern from of movements across several locations, and towards killing sites demonstrated "the deliberate nature of the operation" - Para 5669: Operation encompassed the killing of *all* Bosnian Muslim men in Serb custody, regardless of whether they were combatant or civilian; or whether they were captured or had surrendered... - This, along with the "systematic and highly organised nature of the killings, demonstrates a clear intent to kill every able-bodied Bosnian Muslim male from Srebrenica...", which "may lead to the group's extinction"... "only reasonable inference"... is that members "orchestrating this operation intended to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica as such." ## Substantiality of targeted group - Para 5672: "where part of a protected group is targeted for destruction, such part must be substantial." - Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica were a small percentage of the total Bosnian Muslim population, but the enclave was of strategic importance due to its proximity to Serbia, symbolic stature as a refuge for Muslims, and its elimination despite being a safe area would symbolise the potential fate of all Bosnian Muslims. ## JCE and the Accused's responsibility - Para 5676: From March 1995, Karadzic and Mladic oversaw a "final push to end the Bosnian Muslim presence in Srebrenica and eastern \[BiH]"... planning to take over the enclave and forcibly transfer the Bosnian Muslim population - Para 5679: From as early as May 1992, Karadzic and Mladic, amongst others, "shared the common purpose of permanently removing Bosnian Muslims... from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory", through inhumane acts (forcible transfer) - Directive 4 - Issued Nov 1992 - aimed to force the Bosnian Muslim population to leave the wider Srebrenica area - Major offensive in 1993 - forced Bosnian Muslims from Vlasenica and Bratunac to Srebrenica, and concluded with Srebrenica becoming a UN-protected safe area - Directive 7 - March 8th, 1995 - Karadzic issued the directive which included an order to "create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa" - Also included an order to civ and military organs co-operating with UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) - To reduce support for UNPRFOR to the enclaves and supply of resources to the Muslim population, "making them dependent on our good will while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international community" - Implemented through the restriction of humanitarian aid to Srebrenica (para. 5682) ## Development of the plan to eliminate - Krivaja 95 - End of June 1995 - Karadzic meets with Krstic to give him a combat assignment - Krstic and other Drina Corps commanders draft the plan - Drina Corps order for 2 July did not originally include the take-over of Srebrenica town, but rather the splitting of the enclave - Active combat operations begin on July 6th - July 8th: Karadzic discusses reinforcements with Zivanovic, telling him "all right General, full speed ahead. Tell Krstic, order to go full steam ahead." - July 9th - Bosnian Serb Forces reach within 1km of Srebrenica town - Krstic reports to the Main Staff that conditions for "extending the attack towards Srebrenica" are created - Karadzic approves the expansion of Krivaja 95 to take over the town - Tolimir drafts the order, which Mladic relays to his subordinates - Order states that "full protection" should be given to UNPROFOR member and the Bosnian Muslim civ population - Karadzic orders to redeploy mixed special police units from Sarajevo to the Srebrenica front - Main Staff also redeploys units - July 10th - Bosnian Serb forces attempt to deceive UNPROFOR while continuing to advance towards the town - "members of the Main Staff deliberately lied to the UNPROFOR officials with whom they spoke on 10 and 11 July, and... the Accused was aware of this tactic." - Para. 5689 - July 11th - Karadzic informed of the fall of Srebrenica in the late afternoon - Town mostly empty, but Bosnian Serb Forces called upon remaining inhabitants to leave their houses - Mladic orders Bosnian Serb Forces to move towards the UN Compound where Muslims were sheltering; turns to a TV camera and says "Finally \[...] the time has come to take revenge on the Turks in this region." - Para. 5690 - Karadzic appoints Deronjic as civilian commissioner in Srebrenica - Ordered that Deronjic would ensure those who participated in combat would be taken as POWs and the civilians could "freely choose where they live or move to" - Deronjic would be "directly responsible... for all civilian affairs in Srebrenica" - Chamber considered this establishment as an indication that the removal of Bosnian Muslims was intended to be permanent (Para. 5694) - July 11th-12th - Bosnian Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political/Governmental Organs mobilise resources for a "massive transport operation" - Mladic issues an order for the mobilisation of buses - all buses sent to Bratunac stadium by 10 am on the 12th - Krstic orders 50 buses to Bratunac stadium by 5pm - July 12th - Boarding of buses begins in the early afternoon - Mladic tells the crowd that the people can choose whether to stay or leave, but had later said "they've all capitulated and surrendered and we'll evacuate them all - those who want to and those who don't want to" - "Overnight and the following day, the Bosnian Serb Forces subjected the Bosnian Muslims who still remained at the UN Compound to numerous incidents of physical and sexual violence." - 11-13th July - Up to 30,000 Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly were bussed to Bosnian Muslim-held territory ## Killing of Bosnian Muslim men and boys - Para 5713 - "members of the security organs at all levels of the VRS command played prominent roles in organising the logistics of the detention, killing and subsequent burial of the detainees in Zvornik." - Para 5715 - Beara, at a briefing of VRS officers, highlighted that they had a lot of detainees in various locations and that they had to "get rid of them". He claimed that this order originated from "two Presidents." - 16th July - Beara told by Slobodan Cerovic of "instructions from above \[...] to do triage on \[the detainees]", before sending detainees from the Kula School to the Branjevo Military Farm for execution. - Beara and Popovic also present in a café across the Pilica Cultural Centre, where Beara congratulated soldiers who had just carried out the exectution of 500 Bosnian Muslim men. That evening, Popovic stated he had "finished the job \[...] finished everything" - 17th July - Popovic remains in the Zvornik area to supervise the burials of those killed at Branjevo Military Farm and Pilica Cultural Centre the day before. - "Over the course of the preceding five days, at least 5,115 Bosnian Muslim males had been killed." - Conclusions - The plan to remove the Bosnian Muslim population from Srebrenica, devised in March 1995, had evolved "into a concrete common plan to eliminate them" - The detentions and executions of Bosnian Muslim males were carried out in multiple locations with "striking similarities" in the Zvornik area between 13 and 16 July 1995 - Bosnian Muslim males detained in four different schools until July 14th, when they were taken to various locations where they were "shot and killed by members of the Bosnian Serb Forces." - As early as noon 14th July, the Zvornik Brigade Engineering Company was mobilised to dig graves and bury the bodies, sometimes "while the killings were still ongoing" - Subsequent re-burial operations in September and October further the "Chamber's finding that the killings... were committed pursuant to a common plan." - Development of the common plan timeline - Chamber was satisfied "beyond reasonable doubt that these killings were carried out pursuant to a systematic and highly organised plan." - 11th July - Bosnian Serb Forces begin to obtain intelligence on the Bosnian Muslim Males amongst the population in Potocari, as well as those fleeing towards Tuzla - 12th July - Before 10 a.m., Popovic tells Momir Nokolic that "all the balijas should be killed" - Chamber was convinced that the plan had been established by the time of the third Hotel Fontana meeting at 10 a.m. on July 12th - Karadzic argued the plan did not exist until at least the afternoon of 13th July, referring to a meeting on that day. The Chamber countered that this meeting only concerned "*where* such an operation should be carried out", but that the decision to kill the detainees was not debated (Para. 5732) ## Participants - Para. 5734 - Common plan was formed and executed "in conditions designed to ensure its secrecy to the greatest extend possible." - Krstic order limiting access to the area - Tolimir's proposal to move detainees "from locations where they could be sighted" - "upon the instruction of the members of the Main Staff, a number of measures were taken to limit the extent to which those not directly involved in the killing operation were aware of it." - Mladic, Beara and Popovic "shared the expanded common purpose of eliminating the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica by killing the men and boys." (Para. 5737) - Para. 5741 - Genocide "as the only reasonable inference based on the pattern of the killings and the evidence intent to kill every able-bodied Bosnian Muslim male from Srebrenica was that such killings were committed with the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica." - Refers to the "dogged commitment" to pursue the fleeing column and kill them, "irrespective of whether they were combatants or civilians and regardless of whether they were captured or had surrendered from the column." # Karadzic's participation in the Srebrenica JCE ## Submissions of the parties - Prosecution claims the significant contributions of Karadzic are reflected in 3 main categories of actions and/or omissions 1. Directed and authorised subordinates within the VRS, the MUP and the civilian authorities, over which he was the only individual with *de jure* and *de facto* authority. He was also kept informed through phone conversations, in-person contacts, and written reports. Prosecution also asserts that he was on notice of the crimes, including executions, "almost immediately." 2. Participated in the design and formulation of acts in the implementation of the JCE - involved "issuance of orders and the maintenance of oversight." 3. Deliberately failing to take measures to prevent crimes he knew were happening as well as praising and promoting key members of the Srebrenica JCE - he failed to protect and "created and sustained an environment of impunity through which he encouraged the ongoing implementation of the Srebrenica JCE" - Accused argues: - It must be proven that he formed an agreement "not only to murder or exterminate the men of Srebrenica, but that it was to commit genocide." - There is no evidence that he agreed to such a plan - That he was never informed about the execution of Bosnian Muslim males from Srebrenica - prosecution doesn't show beyond reasonable doubt that he was informed "of any facts from which he could conclude that genocide would be, was being, or had been committed in Srebrenica." - That he never shared genocidal intent - Chamber notes: - Between the night of 11 July and the morning of 12 July, the expanded plan to kill the men and boys was formed - This would have been prior to the third meeting at the Hotel Fontana - At least Mladic, Beara and Popovic shared the expanded common purpose ## Accused's acts and conduct in context - Directive 7 - Issued on 8 March 1995 - Included an order to "create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica or Zepa." - Instructed "relevant State and military organs" to reduce the supply of UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid to the Bosnian Muslims - The result would be "making them dependent on \[the Bosnian Serbs'] good will while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international community and international public opinion." - "State Committee" - Formed by Karadzic 6 days after Directive 7; headed by Koljevic - Responsible for approving the passage of humanitarian aid convoys - Though the VRS was responsible for approving UNPROFOR supply convoys, the Main Staff sought Karadzic's guidance before negotiating with the UN body - Karadzic "thus controlled the policy of restriction which was implemented by Mladic" - UNPROFOR meetings - Karadzic said he would not allow aid to reach eastern enclaves, as long as Bosnian Serbs were under international sanctions - In the months following Directive 7, "conditions in Srebrenica deteriorated to disastrous levels and by the end of June, some residents had died of starvation." - July 9th - Tolimir contacts Karadzic to inform him that the conditions for taking Srebrenica had been created - Karadzic then approved the expansion of Krivaja 95 and "ordered the Bosnian Serb Forces to take over the town." - July 10th - Karadzic redeploys part of the MUP forces in the Trnovo area towards Srebrenica - July 11th - Karadzic is informed at least twice that the Bosnian Serb Forces had taken over Srebrenica - Three orders issued 1. Deronjic appointed civilian commissioner for Srebrenica, with his functions determined by Karadzic 2. RS MUP ordered to form an SJB in "Serb Srebrenica", which would closely co-operate with Deronjic 3. Only the State Committee would approve humanitarian convoys, following consultations with Karadzic - July 12th - Kovac forwards the 2nd order to Vasic, who then meets with Mladic and Krstic where "tasks were assigned to all participants" - Third Hotel Fontana meeting begins at 10 a.m. - Covers the "evacuation of the civilian population from Potocari to Kladanj" - 100 trucks already provided - Joint police forces advance on Potocari "with the aim of taking UNPROFOR personnel prisoner, surrounding the entire civilian population, and clearing the terrain of enemy groups." - Through the night between 11 and 12 July, Bosnian Serb Forces become aware of the fleeing column of Bosnian Muslim men - Kovac orders units to intercept them and "mop up the terrain" - Vasic reports that of ~25,000 Bosnian Muslims gathered in Potocari, less than 10% were able-bodied males - it was suggested that some could leave *"in order to have the others from the woods to surrender"* - Around 5:30 p.m. Vasic relays that ~8,000 "men of military age" were in the Konjevic Polje and Sandici sector - July 13th - Vasic reports to Kovac and Karisik's respective officers, stating that after having met with Mladic, the VRS was continuing operations including the transfer of 15,000 Bosnian Muslims, and the "killing of about 8,000 Bosnian Muslim soldiers whom we blocked in the woods near Konjevic Polje" - Between 3:50 and 4:10 p.m., Kovac meets with Karadzic - Kovac attempted to persuade the Chamber that this meeting concerned Sarajevo, though his testimony is described as inconsistent and evasive - e.g. Kovac initially stated he had gone to the Srebrenica area under order from Karadzic, but later denied doing so (p. 2408-2409) - Kovac had been personally receiving reports from July 6th, including throughout the 12th and 13th - Given that RS MUP units were deployed to Srebrenica under order from Karadzic, which was conveyed through Kovac, and that Kovac left for Vlasenica immediately after their meeting, "the Chamber finds it inconceivable that Kovac did not discuss the developments on the ground in Srebrenica... with the Accused... on 13 July" - July 13th, after Kovac's departure - Between 5 and 6:40 p.m., Karadzic met with three people, with two others attending intermittently - An attendee testified that Karadzic spent an hour on the phone, which ended with an understanding that "Srebrenica was "done'", with Karadzic thanking the person on the line - Karadzic also rewarded and promoted a couple of generals, including Krstic - Two attendees testified that the person on the phone was "General Mladic", but another denied this - Chamber was "satisfied that... the Accused indeed spoke to Mladic during their meeting on 13 July" - Around 6 p.m., as Karadzic was in his meeting, Mladic, Krstic and Zivanovic were at the Drina Corps Command ; Mladic was reportedly "inebriated and in a good mood", making "numerous phone calls to technical or logistics units to bury 'those that had been killed'" - July 13th, intercepted phone call - ~8.10 p.m., Deronjic talking to Karadzic via an intermediary - I: "Deronjic, the President is asking how many thousands?" - D: "About two for the time being."... "But there'll be more during the night." ... - I: "Deronjic, the President says: 'All the goods must be placed inside the warehouses before twelve tomorrow." ... "not in the warehouses over there, but somewhere else." - D: "Understood." - "The Chamber therefore finds that during the intercepted conversation described above, the Accused conveyed to Deronjic the direction that the detainees should be transferred to Zvornik." (Para. 5773) - July 14th - Kovac travels to the Bratunac area with Vasic at 11 a.m., where the Chamber held that he would have seen a convoy of buses carrying Bosnian Muslim male detainees to Zvornik - Karadzic meets with Deonjic between 12:40 p.m. and 1:10 p.m. - 2:25 p.m. - Karadzic meets with a larger delegation from Srebrenica for four hours, where he decides to form the War Presidency of Srebrenica-Skelani Municipality, to which he appointed Deronjic - 6 p.m. - Karadzic receives a call from a "field commander" reporting that thousands of "Muslim soldiers" were in the woods trying to "break through towards Tuzla" - Karadzic declares a state of war in the area, allowing the military and police to utilise "all human and material resources without submitting requests for mobilisation, and allowed for the military to requisition civilian property, such as equipment for burial, without complicated procedural protocols." (Para. 5779) - Later in the day, Beara cited an order from "two Presidents", telling the Zvornik municipal authorities that he expected them to co-operate in "getting rid" of the detainees - Kovac meets with Karadzic at 10:45 and 11:10 p.m. ; earlier that day, Kovac had attended a meeting where they discussed the killings at Kravica Warehouse on the 13th - Chamber found that the "only reasonable inference" of Kovac's activities over the 2 day-period was that he "indeed shared the knowledge and observations he had gathered during his trip with the Accused during their meeting on 14 July." - Kovac had warned to Borovcanin that MUP units should "distance themselves from anything other than combat tasks" - the Chamber found it "incredible that Kovac would not have discussed these matters with the Accused." - 15th July - Zvonko Bajagic goes to Pale to meet with Karadzic - Prosecution argues that the visit was to brief Karadzic on the events in Srebrenica, including the killings - Chamber states that Bajagic's testimony was "full of inconsistencies and contradictions" - Bajagic denied knowledge of the events, but the Chamber noted that on the 13th, he had seen Bosnian Muslim captives sitting at the Kasaba football field, where he was prevented from taking photos ; Bajagic "also conceded that he heard about the killings at the Kravica Warehouse... on 14 July" - Chamber found that "the only reasonable inference is that Bajagic reported the events in Srebrenica he had witnessed on 13 and 14 July to the Accused during their meeting on 15 July." - 16th July - "Nikola" informs Karadzic that "the message being conveyed by American television reports on Srebrenica was 'terrible'" - Nikola then requested a clear statement from Karadzic on the treatment of civilians, in order to help address the "terrible propaganda" - 17th July - Karadzic does interview with David Frost, claiming civilians had wanted to leave Srebrenica on their own - "17 July 1995 Statement", which stated that Bosnian Muslims had been "evacuated" at their own request and arrangements to do so had been made with three civilian representatives of the local population, offered as proof - When asked about the 15,000 men unaccounted for, Karadzic claimed the lines were open and men were allowed to pass - Mladic is repeatedly asked to give ICRC and UNHCR access to Srebrenica and "all the detained people" - Mladic argued that Srebrenica had been "finished in a correct way", referring to the 17 July 1995 Statement - Mladic refers to a "corridor", allegedly opened on 10-11 July, allowing a "significant number" of Bosnian Muslim forces to break towards Tuzla - 24th July - Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights asks Karadzic for access to UN field staff in areas under his control, but doesn't get a reply - By late July, ICRC reps gained access to Batkovic Camp, but could only find 164 detainees - they were told no others were being held - Early August - Karadzic press office commends Zivanovic and Krstic as "the main architect\[s] of the Serbian victories in Srebrenica and Zepa" - Karadzic also congratulates VRS Main Staff, Drina Corps command and "staff of the Police Armed forces" on the "brilliant victory in Srebrenica and Zepa" - Mladic appointed to Office of the President of the RS - Krstic recognised specifically for having planned the Srebrenica operation, "and for having conducted the task exceptionally, with the assistance of the Supreme Command and Mladic" - 6th August - Karadzic at the 52nd Bosnian Serb Assembly Session: *"We achieved success in Srebrenica and Zepa, no fault can be found with the success, no objections to it, of course a lot of stupid things were done afterwards, because many Muslim soldiers were roaming the woods and that is when we sustained losses"* - 22nd March 1996 - Karadzic, in a conversation with Mladic, discusses the need for a commission to "really investigate all the deaths and killings around Srebrenica during the war" - 1st April 1996 - Karadzic orders the Main Staff, RS MUP, Ministry of Justice and Administration, Supreme Court, Supreme Military Court, RS Public Prosecutor, and VRS Military Prosecutor to carry out a "detailed investigation" of areas "where victims of the armed conflict in and around Srebrenica are to be found" - No criminal proceedings were initiated, even though rumours of massive killings were "common knowledge" in Bijeljina, as "VRS officers spoke about it openly" - RS Military Prosecutor's Office in Bijeljina never received the 1st April Order, and other addressees did not implement it - No civilian prosecutions either ## Accused's membership in the JCE - Summary opening - Chamber has already found that Karadzic's and Mladic's long-term strategy to remove the Bosnian Muslim population from Srebrenica had transformed into a "concrete plan to eliminate them", first by removing women, children and elderly, then by killing the men and boys - In this section, the Chamber analyses whether Karadzic shared this objective - Karadzic's defence - Admits to approving the plan to "shrink" the enclave and then take it over, but denies that this plan ever "contemplated the execution of Bosnian Muslim detainees" - Argues that the decision to take Srebrenica was not a crime - Chamber contends that, though the "take-over itself was not a criminal operation *per se*... the take-over of Srebrenica was devised with the intent to permanently remove the Bosnian Muslim population living there." - Communications - Karadzic constantly kept abreast of developments on the ground - Briefings with high-ranking officers - Regular written reports from multiple branches of the Bosnian Serb Forces - As Supreme Commander of the VRS, he received daily combat reports from the Main Staff - Chamber did not receive evidence that these reports mentioned the killing of Bosnian Muslim male detainees - From 12th July, reports mentioned transfer of Bosnians, as well as the column of men attempting to reach Tuzla; and the Serb Forces attempt to block them - 13th, 14th July - Reports describe the capture and surrender of large numbers of men from the column - Further reports stopped mentioning prisoners, but did discuss efforts to block the rest of the column - Popovic had also told Jokic "not to make a record of the activities involving the killing aspect of the plan to eliminate or to speak on the radio about it" - 12th July conversation with Zivanociv at around 1 a.m. - Zivanovic claimed that he informed Karadzic on the "liberation" of Srebrenica, before ending the conversation - The Chamber contended that Karadzic had already been informed of this by Gvero, and he had told Zivanovic that he had not yet managed to contact Mladic or Krstic. This strongly suggests that Karadzic was looking for additional information by the time of his conversation with Zivanovic - Chamber found it "inconceivable that Zivanovic would not have provided the Accused with further updates regarding the events on the ground..." - July 13th - conversations with Kovac and Mladic - Afternoon conversation with Mladic, who "had been receiving continuous updates since the commencement of the Srebrenica operation" - One hour phone call with Mladic, "who was then at the Drina Corps Command and reported that Srebrenica was 'done'". - July 13th - evening conversation with Deronjic through an intermediary - Discussion about the fate of thousands of Bosnian Muslim male detainees - No explicit mention of killings, but the Chamber considers the reference to "goods" being placed "inside the warehouses before twelve" are a clear euphemism, with "somewhere else" being a direction to move the detainees to Zvornik before being killed, as they were - Earlier that evening, Deronjic had complained about detainees in Bratunac and urged Beara to use his connections to Karadzic to move the buses - after this meeting, Beara and Deronjic only discussed *where*, not whether the detainees would be killed - Chamber found the conversation to "demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt the Accused's agreement to the expansion of the objective to encompass the killing of the Bosnian Muslim males." - July 14th - meeting with Deronjic - Followed by a larger meeting lasting about 4 hours - "Only reasonable inference" that Deronjic travelled to Pale to privately report to Karadzic on "significant events relating to the killing aspect of the plan to eliminate, and receive further instructions; thus during their initial meeting, the Accused and Deronjic must have discussed the murder and burial operations then in progress..." - Karadzic acknowledged that by the time of this meeting, Deronjic was aware of the killings at Kravica Warehouse on 13 and 14 July - Simic testified that Deronjic had told him that he informed Karadzic about the events at Kravica Warehouse - Chamber had "no doubt that during the individual meeting between Deronjic and the Accused, they both discussed the killings at the Kravica Warehouse, and the implementation of the Accused's order to transport the detainees from Bratunac to Zvornik by midday that day." - July 15th - Meeting with Bajagic - Bajagic had been prevented from taking photos of Bosnian Muslim detainees at Nova Kasaba football field, and had heard about the killings at Kravica - he met with Karadzic and reported these events in the early hours of the morning - Chamber summary of above evidence - Karadzic's order to allow Bosnian Muslims the freedom to choose on whether to leave or stay was insufficient. Deronjic, charged with implementing the order, had been at the 2nd and 3rd Hotel Fontana meetings, where Mladic coerced Bosnian Muslim representatives into agreeing to leave the enclave * Karadzic "adopted and embraced the expansion of the plan to entail the killing of the Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica during his conversation with Deronjic on the evening of 13 July." * Must have known of the killings due to his position as Supreme Commander, RS President, and the "continuous flow of information he was seeking and receiving from the ground from many different sources" * Karadzic must have known about the killing aspect "at some point prior to his conversation with Deronjic in the evening of 13 July" * Para 5811. * No actions to investigate or prosecute the direct perpetrators of the killings; instead, Karadzic's office issued a press release congratulating the units involved on the "brilliant victory in Srebrenica and Zepa"; weeks later, he referred to Mladic as a "legend" * "Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused shared the common purpose of eliminating the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica with the other members of the JCE" ## Accused's contribution to the Srebrenica JCE * Means of significant contribution * *de jure* powers used to establish Bosnian Serb municipal structures - indicating that the removal of Bosnian Muslims was to be permanent * Order issued allowing Karadzic to oversee and control humanitarian access, thereby limiting international access * Order to Deronjic to transfer the detainees held in Bratunac; they were taken to Zvornik and killed * Karadzic was the only person within the RS "with the power to intervene" and prevent the killings * Mladic's order - consistent with Karadzic's decision to move the detainees - was "almost immediately communicated down the chain of command" ; at a VRS officer briefing, Beara claimed to have received an order from "two Presidents" to "get rid" of the detainees who were being held in Zvornik * Karadzic declared a state of war in Srebrenica-Skelani on 14th July, and appointed Deronjic as president of the War Presidency, "with full knowledge of the ongoing killing operation" * This was after Srebrenica had already been taken * The declaration allowed armed forces to use all human and material resources without following "complicated procedural protocols, thus facilitating the ongoing killing operation" e.g. burial of bodies with civilian resources * Chamber found that the order expedited the killings * Numerous channels used to maintain oversight over events as they unfolded * Example - 90 minutes after Pandurevic reported to Main Staff that he had opened a corridor for the column, "a Main Staff officer called the Zvornik Brigade on behalf of 'the boss \[...] the main head of state' in order to enquire what had happened'". * That night, reinforcements were sent to the area, and on the next day, the Main Staff sent three colonels to investigate the decision * [Trial Chamber](https://ucr.irmct.org/LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/English/Brief/NotIndexable/MICT-13-55-A/BRF326R0000493407.pdf) found that Karadzic opposed opening the corridor (para. 433) * Conclusion * Position of authority, especially over the VRS and MUP, and acts and omissions on implementing the JCE, the Chamber found Karadzic had "significantly contributed to the Srebrenica JCE" ## Accused's responsibility for crimes pursuant to the JCE # Summaries ## Four JCEs * Municipalities * Overarching JCE to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory * Lasted from Oct 1991 to Nov 1995 * Common plan included crimes of deportation, inhumane acts (forcible transfer) and persecution * Karadzic shared intent and "by virtue of his actions and omissions, significantly contributed to the furtherance of the common purpose of the Overarching JCE." * Para. 5996 * Sarajevo * May 1992 - Oct 1995 * Common plan to establish a campaign of sniping and shelling, "the primary purpose of which was to spread terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo" * Involved the commission of murder, unlawful attacks on civilians, and terror * Karadzic "shared the intent to commit these crimes and that, by virtue of his actions and omissions, the Accused significantly contributed to the furtherance of the common purpose of the Sarajevo JCE." * Para. 5997 * Srebrenica * July 1995 * Common purpose to "eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica - first through the forcible removal of the women, children, and the elderly, and later through the killing of the men and boys - and was shared by the Accused..." * Original scope involved "inhumane acts (forcible transfer) and persecution" * Expanded scope involved "commission of murder and extermination" * Karadzic "shared the intent for these crimes and... agreed with the expanded common purpose, i.e., the killing of the men and boys" on 13 July 1995. * "The Chamber further found that the members of the Srebrenica JCE intended to kill every able-bodied Bosnian Muslim male from Srebrenica while forcibly removing women, children and the elderly, and that such intent amounted to the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica." * "... by virtue of his actions and omissions, the Accused significantly contributed to the furtherance of the common purpose of the Srebrenica JCE." * Also "as a superior exercising effective control over his subordinates, failed to punish the killings and the related acts of persecution that occurred prior to the evening of 13 July 1995, which he either knew or had reason to know." * Para. 5998 * Hostages * 25 May to June 1995 * Common purpose to take UN personnel hostage "in order to compel NATO to abstain from conducting further air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets." * Karadzic shared the intent and "significantly contributed to the furtherance of the common purpose of the Hostages JCE" * Para. 5999 # Links - https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf