## IAEA report May 2025 >[!quote]- Grossi, April 22nd >"Iran is not far from having a nuclear weapon. They don’t have it. We know it. And I always try to repeat so as not to confuse people internationally. But the great difference is that the material for it is already there, to make a few warheads. And that they have in the past, as we all know, conducted research and even testing some of the necessary elements for a nuclear device, which have remained in some form present, or at least we don’t have full confidence that they are—they have disappeared completely." >- Link: https://www.cfr.org/event/nuclear-power-and-proliferation-rising-energy-demand-and-global-security-risks ## ISIS Analysis & Summary - "Iran's nuclear weaponization program is steadily making progress, out of sight of the inspectors of the world" - Iran could convert its stock of 60% enriched uranium into 233kg WGU in 3 weeks at Fordow, enough for 9 nuclear weapons - Could convert the first 25 kg in 2-3 days - Break out in Fordow and Natanz could produce enough for 22 weapons in five months - The speed at which Iran rushed to enrich to 60% resulted in depletion of Iran's near 20% enriched uranium stock, which does have civilian use in research reactors - NOTE: Report rules out bargaining chip theory on this basis - Several experienced IAEA inspectors withdrawn from Iran in Autumn 2024 - June 2024 attempt by IAEA to reconsider this decision - "The withdrawal of the designation of several experienced inspectors was also not in line with the required spirit of cooperation" - 14,689 advanced centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow - Total of 21,900 including installed IR-1 centrifuges - Not all deployed are enriching uranium - "In general, Iran has not prioritised stockpiling uranium enriched between 2 to 5 percent. This choice is at odds with Iran's contention that its primary goal is to accumulate 4 to 5 percent enriched uranium for use in nuclear power reactor fuel." - February 2021: Iran stops implementing Additional Protocol (AP) to its comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and the JCPOA's additional monitoring arrangements - IAEA unable to conduct complementary access to sites and other locations in Iran - IAEA has "lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC (uranium ore concentrate)" - Removal of Agency equipment had "detrimental implications" for the Agency's ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of the programme - IAEA - Can know the number of centrifuges at Fordow and Natanz - Cannot know how many Iran has made and stored or deployed at an undeclared site - It would require relatively few advanced centrifuge cascades to enrich HEU to WGU - IAEA's ability to detect diversion of materials is "greatly diminished" ## Post-strikes damage - [Iranian president](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-july-02-2025/) suspends cooperation with IAEA - [No timetables](https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-cooperation-8bbdc81b9199d8d179d0fb2e1b8dac2a) or details - Tehran still to negotiate with the US - The hierarchy in Iran can implement the bill as they see fit - president and parliament don't have much power - Damage in Fordo - Trump describes strikes as "total obliteration" - Leaked Defence Intelligence Agency document claims damage could have been minimal - [Head of CIA](https://www.npr.org/2025/06/26/nx-s1-5443666/obliterated-damaged-inoperable-iran-nuclear-facilities) says the overall nuclear program was "severely damaged" - [Iranian Foreign Minister](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-bombing-seriously-damaged-irans-fordow-nuclear-site-fm-says-2025-07-02/) told CBS that the site was "seriously and heavily damaged" - [Damage in Natanz](https://www.npr.org/2025/06/26/nx-s1-5443666/obliterated-damaged-inoperable-iran-nuclear-facilities) - Overground site appears "severely damaged" - "Enormous" underground facility in the side of a mountain near Natanz appears intact. The purpose of this facility "remains unclear" - [Damage in Isfahan](https://www.npr.org/2025/06/26/nx-s1-5443666/obliterated-damaged-inoperable-iran-nuclear-facilities) - Iran's main site for preparing uranium for enrichment and converting it to metal afterwards - Putting uranium into metallic form is critical towards building to weapons - converted from uranium hexafluoride (UF6) - Tunnels near the site - thought to be used for storage - seem largely intact - [Damage in Arak](https://www.npr.org/2025/06/26/nx-s1-5443666/obliterated-damaged-inoperable-iran-nuclear-facilities) - Heavy water reactor that could potentially produce plutonium - Reactor was built but never started - IAEA report on damage - [Head](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-nuclear-enrichment-iaea-rafaeal-marino-grossi-face-the-nation-interivew/#:~:text=Iran's%20nuclear%20capabilities%20suffered%20%22severe,and%20there%20is%20nothing%20there.%22) of the watchdog claims "severe damage" but not "total damage" - IAEA inspectors were "never able to verify Iran's claims that its nuclear program was only for peaceful ends and that it was not trying to develop a weapon" - "We didn't see a program that was aiming in that direction, but at the same time, they were not answering very, very important questions that were pending" - Grossi - [Grossi CBS](https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/transcript-rafael-mariano-grossi-international-atomic-energy-agency-face-the-nation-with-margaret-brennan-june-28-2025/) interview - IAEA had "perfect view" on the number of centrifuges and the amount of material - "We had found traces of uranium in some places in Iran, which were not the normal declared facilities... and we were simply not getting credible answers" - "The capacities they have are there. They can have... in a matter of months... a few cascades of centrifuges spinning and producing enriched uranium, or less than that." ## Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - Effective 1970 - Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and South Sudan not party to the treaty - Calls for the "prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons" - Support for R&D ***within the framework of IAEA safeguards*** - Article I: Prevents the transfer of nuclear weapons from one state to another and not to assist non-nuclear weapon states to acquire these weapons - Article II: Prevents non-nuclear weapon states from receiving nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices - Article III: Calls upon non-nuclear weapon states to uphold agreements with the IAEA individually or with other states. Agreements would be made 18 months after beginning negotiations - Article IV: Affirms the right of all parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy - Q: Is America violating this right by pressuring Iran to accept a deal that allows zero enrichment on Iranian soil? - Article V: Allows states to explore peaceful applications of nuclear explosions under international observation - Article VI: Each party should negotiate on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race - Article VII: States allowed to have regional treaties in order to prevent proliferation - Article VIII: Any party can propose amendments, which must be approved by a majority of parties, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon parties - Article IX: Concerns signatures and ratification - Article X: States have a right to withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events have "jeopardised the supreme interests of its country." - Full text: https://treaties.unoda.org/t/npt ## Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) - General provisions - "Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons" - Comprehensive lifting of all UNSC sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme - Includes steps on access in trade, technology, finance and energy - IAEA requested to monitor and verify nuclear-related measures and to provide regular updates to the UNSC - Nuclear: Enrichment, R&D, Stockpiles - Specific limits on enrichment, including limits on specific R&D for the first 8 years - Phasing out of IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years - Total enrichment capacity at Natanz at "up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges" - Excess centrifuges stored under IAEA monitoring - Iran will continue R&D in a manner that doesn't accumulate enriched uranium - Phasing out of IR-1 centrifuges - After 8 years, Iran will start to manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 and store them until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment plan - NO uranium enrichment past 3.67% for 15 years - Conversion of Fordow into a nuclear, physics and technology centre - Uranium stockpile to be kept under 300 kg of 3.67% uranium hexafluoride (UF6) - Arak, Heavy Water, Reprocessing - Redesign and rebuilding of a heavy water research reactor in Arak - "will not produce weapons grade plutonium" - "All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market" - Transparency and confidence building measures - Iran will allow IAEA monitoring, including - Long-term presence in Iran - Monitoring of uranium ore concentrate production for 25 years - Containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years - Sanctions - Termination of previous UNSC resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue - 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, 2224 - Termination of EU nuclear-related sanctions - Transfer of funds between EU persons and entities and Iranian persons and entities - Banking activities - Provision of insurance - SWIFT access - Financial support for trade - Import, transport and investment in oil and gas - Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights - Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds - Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals e.g. aluminium and steel - Termination of US sanctions to take effect simultaneously with implementation of IAEA-verified measures - Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions - Trade limitations - Purchase of Iranian sovereign debt, including government bonds - Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran - Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales - Transactions with Iran's energy sector - Shipping and ship building sectors - Trade in gold and other precious metals - Trade in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals, coal - Sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector - Sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts to Iran - Importation of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs - 8 years after adoption day, the US will seek legislative action to terminate sanctions - The EU and US will refrain from re-introducing sanctions "without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA" - Implementation plan - 14th July 2015: Agreement finalised between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, UK, US and Germany) - 18th October 2015: Adoption Day 90 days after endorsement by the UNSC - 16th January 2016: Implementation - Transition Day 8 years after Adoption Day - Dispute Resolution Mechanism - 15 days to resolve disputes between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs - Advisory Board consulted (for 5 days max) if the issue is unresolved after 30 days - UNSC notified if a resolution is still not reached - "Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole of in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part" - Signed in July 2015; Terminated by Trump in 2018 - Full text: https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf ## JCPOA arguments - [Khamenei's red lines](https://x.com/khamenei_ir/status/613649656950718465), June 24th 2015 - "No long-term restrictions" - No acceptance of 12-12 year restrictions - Continuation of R&D during the period of restrictions - Sanctions to be removed on the day the deal is signed - Removal of sanctions "must not be tailored to implementation of Iran's commitments" - "IAEA verification for any step not accepted" - Iran doesn't seem to trust them: "Because the IAEA has proved for several times that neither does it work independently, nor is it fair, and thus we are pessimistic about it." - "No inspection of military sites can ever be done" - Time frame of 15-25 years not accepted - [Sunset provisions](https://archive.ph/SfuZo#selection-1743.321-1743.390) - 300kg cap until 2030 - 3.67% enrichment until 2030 - Restriction on first-gen centrifuges until 2025 - Tehran must notify the IAEA when it decides to build a nuclear facility (in perpetuity) - Previous agreement with the IAEA meant it only had to alert the international community 6 months before introducing nuclear material into the country - Loophole enabled Iran to build undeclared facilities, which were discovered in 2002 and 2009 - Iran initially demanded 2 years of constraints - Iran treated differently from NPT signatories because of transgressions - [Problem with sunset provisions](https://archive.ph/No9im) - "Once these limits expire, Iran could operate many more centrifuges of a better quality, enabling it to enrich enough uranium for a bomb in weeks" - Iran doesn't need to enrich reactor fuel because Russia already provides it - Tehran refused any deal preventing enrichment because they didn't want to depend on Russia indefinitely - Author suggests Iran would agree to extensions - they didn't - [AP doc 2016](https://apnews.com/general-news-140ca41aba7a42cda13792f07df4b8d3) ## Timeline - [Feb, 2016](https://archive.ph/6Ey0p): IAEA reports that Iran exceeded the heavy-water limit of 130 tonnes by 0.9 - [March, 2016](https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/09/469841634/iran-tests-two-ballistic-missiles-reportedly-designed-to-reach-israel): Iran tests two ballistic missiles "designed to reach Israel" - [Fars](https://static-cdn.toi-media.com/www/uploads/2016/03/zzzzzzzzzzzzz.jpg) news screenshot - "The 2,000 kilometre range of our missiles is to confront the Zionist regime... Israel is surrounded by Islamic countries and it will not last long in a war. It will collapse even before being hit by these missiles" - [Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of IRGC aerospace division](https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-fires-2-missiles-marked-with-israel-must-be-wiped-out/) - [April, 2016](https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/274954-obama-iran-has-followed-letter-but-not-spirit-of-nuke-deal/): Obama accuses Iran of not following the spirit of the deal: "When they launch ballistic missiles with slogans calling for the destruction of Israel, that makes business nervous." - [November, 2016](https://archive.ph/6Ey0p): IAEA reports a second instance of excess heavy-water (0.1 tonnes). US confirmed Iran's intention to export the excess - [Dec, 2018](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/03/iran-missile-tests-may-breach-un-resolution-france-uk-warn): Iran accused of violating the spirit of UNSC 2231 with ballistic missile test - resolution "calls on", rather than "forbids" - [Dec, 2020](https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2021/why-iran-producing-60-cent-enriched-uranium): Iran began to enrich to ~19.% in violation of JCPOA terms - [Feb, 2021](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-56234015): Iran starts restricting site IAEA site inspections - [Feb, 2021](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-56234015): Iran rules out informal meeting with US and European powers to revive nuclear deal - Biden insisted Tehran returns to full compliance first - Iran insisted America lifts all unilateral sanctions - [April 13th, 2021](https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2021/why-iran-producing-60-cent-enriched-uranium): Iran announced intention to enrich uranium to 60% - [Oct 18th, 2023](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9870/CBP-9870.pdf): All remaining nuclear-related sanctions lifted under UNSC 2231, including ballistic missile and sensitive technologies ## Anticipatory self-defence * No Article 51 notification given by Israel to the UN Security Council * Timeline * June 12th: IAEA finds Iran non-compliant and can't rule out that Iran has diverted nuclear material to nuclear weapons * June 13th: Israel strikes * June 15th: Oman talks (cancelled) * Operation Opera, Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor was condemned by UNSC in Resolution 487 * *Jus ad bellum* - the law governing the resort to force as an instrument of national policy * "Anticipatory self-defence" * No legal right unless an armed attack is imminent * Traditional use of 'immanency' to give diplomacy the maximum potential * Changes after 9/11 * 2002, US National Security Strategy (NSS) noted that a devastating armed attack could be launched without warning, even with nuclear weapons * Requirements of intent, capability and 'last opportunity' * 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder: "The evaluation of whether an individual presents an imminent threat incorporates considerations of the relevant window of opportunity to act... and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks against the United States." * If action were to be delayed until an end stage of planning, when the precise time, place and manner of attack is clear "would create an unacceptably high risk that our efforts would fail, and that Americans would be killed" * [Chatham House *Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence*](Whether the attack is “imminent” depends upon the nature of the threat and the possibility of dealing effectively with it at any given stage. Factors that may be taken into account include: the _gravity_ of the threatened attack—whether what is threatened is a catastrophic use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); _capability_—for example, whether the relevant State or terrorist organisation is in possession of WMD, or merely of material or component parts to be used in its manufacture; and the _nature_ of the attack—including the possible risks of making a wrong assessment of the danger. Other factors may also be relevant, such as the geographical situation of the victim State, and the past record of attacks by the State concerned (p. 967-68).) * *"Whether the attack is “imminent” depends upon the nature of the threat and the possibility of dealing effectively with it at any given stage. Factors that may be taken into account include: the gravity of the threatened attack—whether what is threatened is a catastrophic use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); capability—for example, whether the relevant State or terrorist organisation is in possession of WMD, or merely of material or component parts to be used in its manufacture; and the nature of the attack—including the possible risks of making a wrong assessment of the danger. Other factors may also be relevant, such as the geographical situation of the victim State, and the past record of attacks by the State concerned (p. 967-68)."* * Had Iran committed itself to attacking Israel? * 25 years of threats from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei * May 2025: "The Zionist regime is a lethal, dangerous, cancerous tumour should certainly be eradicated, and it will be." * Such statements could be rhetorical and are therefore uncertain, but a state would have more leeway if the threat of being wrong is existential * ICJ unwilling to rule out the use of nuclear weapons when a State's "very survival would be at stake" * Risk of being wrong about the meaning of Iranian leaders' statements should be borne by the side making the threat - [Bethlehem Principle 8: allows consideration of the scale of harm likely to result from inaction](https://lieber.westpoint.edu/assessing-legality-israels-action-iran-international-law/) - "Whether an armed attack may be regarded as “imminent” will … be assessed by reference to all relevant circumstances, including (a) the nature and immediacy of the threat, (b) the probability of an attack, (c) whether the anticipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity, (d) the likely scale of the attack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom in the absence of mitigating action, and (e) the likelihood that there will be other opportunities to undertake effective action in self-defence that may be expected to cause less serious collateral injury, loss, or damage. The absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature of an attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent for purposes of the exercise of a right of self-defence, provided that there is a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed attack is imminent." - Standard adopted by the UK, US and Australia * Tulsi in March 2025 * Iran is not building a nuclear weapon but: “In the past year, we have seen an erosion of a decades-long taboo in Iran on discussing nuclear weapons in public, likely emboldening nuclear weapons advocates within Iran’s decision-making apparatus. Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is at its highest levels and is unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons.” * Israel's dilemma * The process of building a nuclear weapon can be quick and secretive. Once a weapon has been built, it can be stored underground rendered completely impervious to attack * Window of opportunity might have closed once a weapon was produced * The diplomatic window * Trump's 60 day warning passed after June 12th * Israeli strike on day 61 happened just before planned meeting in Oman * Was the Oman negotiation a US smokescreen? * Iran reacted to IAEA condemnation by announcing that they would build a new enrichment facility and that "other measures are also being planned" * Violation of the prohibition resident in Article 2(4)? * Was Israel liable to lose the opportunity to mount an effective defence if they had waited until the talks in Oman? * Anticipatory defence vs ongoing international armed conflict * Only the initial resort to force is subject to *jus ad bellum* * Iran and Israel have been effectively at war for years, but Operation Rising Lion was a significant shift in the nature of that war which occurred after a relative lull in the fighting * Source: https://lieber.westpoint.edu/israels-operation-rising-lion-right-of-self-defense/ ## Nuclear scientists - Speculation that some scientists were part of the armed forces - For civilian scientists, Red Cross [Interpretive Guidance](https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf) argues that their participation in hostilities is indirect, rather than direct - Preceding debates did show some doubts *"as to whether this assessment could be upheld in extreme situations, namely where the expertise of a particular civilian was of very exceptional and potentially decisive value for the outcome of an armed conflict, such as the case of nuclear weapons experts during the Second World War."* ([n. 122](https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf))