↑ [[Rationality MOC]] "Fake Beliefs" is a concept introduced as the second section of Book I of *[The Sequences](https://www.lesswrong.com/s/7gRSERQZbqTuLX5re)*. It describes the types of irrational beliefs people form, as well as some subtleties in how they may hold onto those beliefs. In order to recognize a false belief, one must understand what constitutes a belief. Eliezer Yudkowski distills this into an *[anticipation of an experience](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/a7n8GdKiAZRX86T5A/making-beliefs-pay-rent-in-anticipated-experiences).* While he seems to make the argument that this should by necessity be a *sensory* experience, I would argue that such a sensation could be an internal or emotional one. A well-formed belief *constrains experience,* it permits one experience but not another. A fake belief permits any experience. A fake belief is different from a false belief. A false belief can be well-formed but simply untrue. In the context of rationality, beliefs are *hypotheses* rather than *epistemological statements*. These may become knowledge claims, but part of creating a robust belief set is testing its components. The validity of a belief is determined by how it constrains experience, not by its consistency with the truth. A person can form false beliefs from a variety of salient experiences or within contexts where the availability of facts is restricted. Fake beliefs are most notable at the intersection of [science and politics](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6hfGNLf4Hg5DXqJCF/a-fable-of-science-and-politics), where the *[[commitment to belief]]* informs how someone responds to new information. Whether the new information contradicts or confirms the belief is irrelevant from the standpoint of rationality, it is how the respondent *engages* with the information that determines whether the mode of their belief is rational. One such mode is "[[Belief in Belief|belief in belief]]," a phrase borrowed from Daniel Dennett's 2006 [book](https://philosophynow.org/issues/91/Breaking_the_Spell_by_Daniel_C_Dennett?ref=list) *Breaking the Spell*. This is an observation of belief as a social phenomenon, a belief reinforced by the type of capital in generates, and not in the specifics of its tenets. This is different from mere charlatanism. Someone who believes their belief will be genuinely offended if the belief's authenticity is challenged, but they will be inconsistent in its practice. The most prominent feature of a practitioner of belief in belief will be how they anticipate the introduction of contradictory statements. Someone who genuinely believes there is a [dragon](http://www.godlessgeeks.com/LINKS/Dragon.htm) in their garage will be baffled by another's inability to sense it. Someone who believes they believe there is a dragon in the garage will instead have a system of arguments to back up their false claim. Religion tends to be the de facto [illustration](https://www.justinclark.org/blog/daniel-dennetts-breaking-the-spell-15-years-on) for belief in belief, namely in the trope of the cash-mongering televangelist. In my opinion, I think it very possible that religious belief may have at one time been rational. This can be traced through Yudkowski's [observation](https://www.readthesequences.com/Religions-Claim-To-Be-Non-Disprovable) of the linear regression between the recording of knowledge and the conservation of religious claims. Archeology has since disproven many of the most outrageous claims, but religion maintains its stance as a resource for cultivating an ethical life. >[!note] >I think people need a means of engaging with life in a mysterious manner, or an open-ended manner, but I dispensed with religion a long time ago. Perhaps this is where the #idea/newMythology becomes relevant. "[Floating beliefs](https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/free-floating-belief)" are another mode of fake beliefs. These are secondary and tertiary statements about the world that are inferred from other beliefs. These are statements that may or may not be true, but are related to the contents of a cognitive structure that they can attach to it without contributing to its soundness. They can be considered a component of [[Cognitive Bias]]. The formation of fake beliefs lead to behaviors and arguments that might be broadly described as signaling **commitment to belief**. One example of commitment to a belief is [[professing and cheering|professing and cheering]]. This is not a belief statement itself but a series of statements that follow from the commitment to the belief. More mildly someone may wear their [[belief as attire|belief as attire]], or make statements that serve as [applause lights](https://www.readthesequences.com/Applause-Lights). In all cases, the profession of belief is a *demonstration* of participation, not a claim about the belief itself. Engaging in this type of belief-forming makes one vulnerable to bias. The natural step from here is to leap headlong into judgement based on the doctrine of the in-group. There is an opposing form of behavior that is equally as harmful, which is the suspension of judgement as the [appearance of wisdom](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/jeyvzALDbjdjjv5RW/pretending-to-be-wise). This is when someone takes a neutral stance in order to avoid the messiness of conflict, of critically examining each grievance and forming a conclusion about whose claim demands attention. This is different from waiting for additional information or recusing oneself in recognition of a bias, it is a refusal to engage as a sign of moral superiority. >[!important] The tiers of the commitment to belief >- [[Belief in Belief]], >- [[belief as attire]] >- [[Professing and cheering]] >- [[8. Applause Lights]] It is worthwhile to point out the difference between "[[proper beliefs]]" and "[[improper beliefs]]." A proper belief does not have to be true in order to be rational. It only needs to anticipate certain outcomes based on a given amount of information. This is the first part of rationality. An unexpected outcome is evidence of the belief's inaccuracy, this is the second part. Does the claimant re-examine the accuracy of their information and adjust the belief to accommodate the new data, or do they hold steadfast to their claim? These are improper beliefs. Inherently, they seem to have a social dimension to them in that they tend to be claims someone makes in order to navigate interpersonal complexity. In this regard, they are not in fact beliefs, but statements. They may go so far as to anticipate certain measures of social approval, but will not pay rent in anticipation for anything else. [[Rationality is epistemic situation awareness]]