Debate Outline - Destiny's Notebook

Palestine: Norm Finkelstein, Mouin Rabbani Israel: Benny Morris, Steven Bonnell (Destiny) # Rhetorical notes - Stop hedging so much. - Always restate narratives as much as possible during questions and responses. - Make sure to maintain chain of argumentation from before and after every question and answer to maintain causal chains. # Primary Claims 1. Britain over-promised the same land to two people. Jewish people bought tracts of land in Palestine from willing Arab sellers even before British guarantees to a right to settle in Palestine. It's inarguable that the Arabs living within the borders of Mandatory Palestine felt betrayed by the British. The Jewish people, however, were betrayed as well. In the wake of the perceived British betrayal, and in the aftermath of the Holocaust, both sides would have felt justified in fighting the other for control over this land. At some point, however, it must be recognized that Israel emerged from the fighting in this region victorious, and surrounding Arab states were forced to recognize Israel as a legitimate entity. 1. Why is this important? 1. Factual Disagreement - It is incorrect to state that incoming Jews were clearly in the wrong, and that they were a colonial project by Great Britain. 2. Moral Significance: It is important to recognize that the founding of Israel represented promises made to both Jewish citizens and Ottoman Empire subjects because it illustrates the moral fallibility of assigning blame in the early stages of the Mandatory Palestine period to either the Jews or the Arabs. Blame should be more heavily assigned to Great Britain. 2. This factual and moral claim is literally found in the first 1964 PLO Covenant, written by the first PLO Chairman, Ahmed Shukeiry. 1. "Article 19. Zionism is a colonialist movement in its inception, aggressive and expansionist in its goals, racist and segregationist in its configurations and fascist in its means and aims. Israel in its capacity as the spearhead of this destructive movement and the pillar for colonialism is a permanent source of tension and turmoil in the Middle East in particular and to the international community in general. Because of this the People of Palestine are worthy of the support and sustenance of the community of nations." [source](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-original-palestine-national-charter-1964) 3. Relevant Deals 1. Balfour Declaration 2. McMahon-Hussein correspondence. 3. Sykes-Picot agreement 4. The League of Nations Mandate System 4. There was never a clear expectation on either the British nor Arab side that Palestine would be 100% dedicated with borders to a single Arab Palestinian state. 5. Jewish Purchasing of land was legal at all stages. 6. Multiple binational agreements/concepts rejected by the Arabs until finally the Peel Commission. 7. Was 1948 a top-down, pre-planned ethnic cleansing of the Arab population within the newly formed Israeli borders? 2. While Israel might have been initially hungry for extra territory, the Arab states constantly gave Israel an excuse to take territory from them. The 1939 White Paper by British would have guaranteed a Palestinian state in 10 years, but Husseini and the AHC rejected it. In 1947, Israel accepted the UN Partition plan while the Arabs refused and instead invaded in 1948. In 1949 (The Lausanne Conference), Israel agreed to accept 100,000 refugees or annex the Gaza Strip in exchange for peace and recognition of its borders, yet the Arabs refused. In 1956, Egypt's closures of the Straits of Tiran gave Israel legitimate *casus belli*. In 1967, despite repeated requests from Israel not to attack, Jordan attacked anyway along with Egypt and Syria, losing the West Bank in the process. Israel was willing to return the Golan Heights in 1967 to Syria in exchange for peace. When Israel attempted to reach a final agreement on the Palestinian problem in 2000, and again in 2008, Arafat and Abbas refused. 1. Why is this important? 2. Factual Disagreement - It is incorrect to say that Israel was acting territorially greedy against passive states, and that the Arab states around them were not engaged in a healthy amount of provocation on their own. 3. Moral Significance - It is important to recognize that, especially in 1948, every state in the region was hungry for land, and the push for territorial conquest was not one-sided. It's also important to recognize that, while Israel ultimately succeeded in conquering additional land, there were multiple opportunities for Arabs to push for peace in ways that would have forced Israel to agree. Peace between Israel and the Arab states didn't come until much, much later because everyone in the region assumed that additional fighting would lead to additional territorial gains, but this only proved to be true for Israel. 2. Quotes from Israel leaders cautioning territorial expansion pre-1967. 1. "David Ben-Gurion was still powerfully drawn to Judea and Samaria by his historical-ideological and strategic considerations, but international diplomatic considerations dictated caution and restraint. Besides, the Jordanians had made it abundantly clear that they were out of the fight, and the Israelis still feared British military intervention should hostilities with Jordan be renewed. Zvi Ayalon, the Central Front OC, assured Ben-Gurion that it would take only "5 days" to conquer the West Bank or large parts of it. But Israel's representatives at the General Assembly meeting in Paris, Abba Eban and Reuven Shiloah, weighed in firmly against." (1948, Benny Morris, pages 350-351) 3. Quotes of Arabs/Palestinians Rejecting Peace 1. Abba Eban quipped in 1973 "The Arabs [or the Palestinians] never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity." 2. In regards to Husseini rejecting the 1939 White Paper, Philip Mattar wrote that the mufti's decision "clearly indicated that he was putting personal considerations and his idealism above practical politics." 4. Examples of Palestinian aggression disrupting ongoing peace processes 1. March 27th, 2002, the Passover massacre occurs the day before the announcement of the Arab Peace Initiative. 1. Suicide bomber killed 30, injured 140. 2. The 2010 Palestinian militancy campaign, to derail peace talks between Netanyahu and Abbas. 1. Random attacks ended with 5 killed, and 5 injured. 5. The lead-up and causes for the Six Day War. 3. The mythologies, loaded languages and international virtue signaling of both sides severely hamper any ability for either people to make progress in this conflict. The victory of Israel in the 1967 war drove their expectations for territorial acquisition to unrealistic heights, causing them to underestimate their Arab neighbors for a crushing psychological defeat in 1973. Similar myths exist on the Palestinian side, where surrounding Arab neighbors drove their expectations for land to unrealistic height, then the international community through UN Resolutions and international declarations made them believe they would acquire a state within the 1967 borders if they simply held out long enough. Constant claims of "apartheid", "concentration camp conditions" and "genocide" have left the Palestinians believing someone in the international community is going to come along and save them from their predicament. 1. Why is this important? 1. Factual Disagreement - The legal status of every single part of this conflict is incredibly hairy, with no clear answers on any side. 2. Moral Significance - By constantly claiming that Israel is committing apartheid, or genocide, or forcing Palestinians to live in concentration camps, the international community is making it seem as though the conditions the Palestinians live in are so dire that someone externally is going to swoop in and save them. This will not happen, the Palestinians need to unite around a coherent leadership structure so they can negotiate with Israel and save themselves. 2. International criticisms of Israel is highly disproportionate compared to its population and number of people of affected. 1. HRW 2. Amnesty International 3. UN Resolutions 3. "Anti-Semitism" 1. This has rightfully been called out by Rabani and Finkelstein as a way to shut down all criticism of Israel and to create an environment where all criticisms can be hand-waved as simply anti-Semitic. This shuts down conservation and makes it impossible to facilitate progress. 4. "Ethnic Cleansing" 1. This isn't even a formally defined crime or thing in international law. 2. Civilian populations move around and retreat during war, but this term never seems to be used for any other conflict besides the Bosnian War and Israel-Palestine. 1. Examples: 1. Ukrainians fleeing during Russia's invasion. 2. [In 1923, 1.6 million people were exchanged between Greece and Turkey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_exchange_between_Greece_and_Turkey) 3. [In 1944-1950, 12-14.6 million Germans expelled from Europe after WWII](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_and_expulsion_of_Germans_(1944%E2%80%931950)) 4. [In 1947 10-20 million people were displaced and 1 million died in the Partition of India.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India) 5. Jews being expelled from the West Bank in 1948. 5. "Open Air Prison" or "Concentration Camps" 1. Definitions 1. There is no definition for either of these things. 2. Hamas Administration 1. According to [Israel and Palestinian sources](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/gaza-plagued-poverty-hamas-no-shortage-cash-come-rcna121099), Hamas spends over $150m/year on their military budget, including $40m/year just on building tunnels. 2. Hamas leadership are [worth billions](https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/palestinian-territories/1698592894-hamas-sits-on-obscene-wealth-while-gaza-falls-further-into-collapse) while living abroad in Qatar. 3. Living conditions 1. The living conditions are clearly better in the Gaza Strip than in any concentration camp, and are in fact competitive with most Middle Eastern countries. 1. [Infant Mortality](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/infant-mortality-rate/country-comparison/) in x deaths/1,000 births 1. Rank 26 | Yemen | 45.5 2. Rank 81 | Iraq | 19.2 4. Rank 85 | Morocco | 18.7 5. Rank 88 | Egypt | 17.3 6. Rank 91 | Gaza | 16 7. Rank 92 | Syria | 15.5 8. Rank 106 | Jordan |13.6 9. Rank 158| Lebanon | 6.9 2. [Life Expectancy](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/life-expectancy-at-birth/country-comparison/) in years 11. Rank 66 | Lebanon | 79 12. Rank 105 | Jordan | 76.3 13. Rank 133 | Gaza | 74.8 14. Rank 134 | Egypt | 74.7 15. Rank 137 | Syria | 74.6 16. Rank 142 | Morocco | 74 17. Rank 145 | Iraq | 73.5 18. Rank 191 | Yemen | 67.8 3. Under-5 mortality 1. Gaza - [26.8 per 1,000](https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1821.pdf). 2. The Middle East/North Africa - [27.6 per 1,000](https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SH.DYN.MORT&country=). 3. Today, the global population average - [38 per 1,000](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/under-five-mortality-rate-(probability-of-dying-by-age-5-per-1000-live-births)). 4. [Human Development Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index) 1. Rank 97 | Egypt | 0.731 2. Rank 102 | Jordan | 0.720 3. Rank 106 | Palestine | 0.715 4. Rank 112 | Lebanon | 0.706 5. Rank 121 | Iraq | 0.686 6. Rank 123 | Morocco | 0.683 7. Rank 150 | Syria | 0.577 8. Rank 183 | Yemen | 0.455 9. "HDI declined from 0.703 in 2013 to 0.698 in 2014, and from 0.716 in 2020 to 0.715 in 2021,46 in the aftermath of the July–August 2014 escalation and the May 2021 escalation, life expectancy declined by 1.4 years." - [The United Nations Development Programme](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-11/2301926e-policybrief-gazawar-escwa-undp-10nov-10pm.pdf) 2. How many deaths due to malnutrition? 1. It's hard to say if anyone before October 7th died of starvation or malnutrition in the Gaza Strip; it's difficult to say for sure if anyone has even died after October 7th thus far from malnutrition or starvation. 4. Quotations to support his argument 1. "Repeating a personal view that he had previously expressed to other USG visitors, NSC Director Eiland laid out for Ambassador Djerejian a different end-game solution than that which is commonly envisioned as the two-state solution. Eiland's view, he said, was prefaced on the assumption that demographic and other considerations make the prospect for a two-state solution between the Jordan and the Mediterranean unviable. Currently, he said, there are 11 million people in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, and that number will increase to 36 million in 50 years. The area between Beer Sheva and the northern tip of Israel (including the West Bank and Gaza) has the highest population density in the world. Gaza alone, he said, is already "a huge concentration camp" with 1.3 million Palestinians. Moreover, the land is surrounded on three sides by deserts. Palestinians need more land and Israel can ill-afford to cede it. The solution, he argued, lies in the Sinai desert." - Giora Eiland from a Israeli [Debrief](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04TELAVIV1952_a.html) relating to the Unilateral Disengagement Plans 1. This quote is from 2004 and is not an analysis of the living conditions of those in the Gaza Strip. 2. "The Gaza Strip today is a concentration camp, but not like Bergen-Belsen. The differences are clear and known. This writer is opposed to parallels lacking information, knowledge and understanding, drawn for purposes of provocation, but is also opposed to creating hierarchies of suffering, which, whether concealed or openly, justify any suffering that does not reach the “climax” (which we, the Jews, define). The use here of the term “concentration camp” is based on the need to break free of the linguistic bonds of the Nazi period.” - Amira Hass [wrote in Haaretz](https://archive.is/clKhw#selection-1241.1-1241.535). 1. This quote, of which Finkelstein omits the last sentence of, seems to stand in opposition to his utilization of this to prove the horrendous living conditions of the people in Gaza. Amira's goal is to broaden the concept of what a concentration camp is, while Norm is attempting to use it in a very narrow way to describe Gaza. 3. "Various versions of this idea became very popular among Israeli Jews and the construction of the fence began at the initiative of the former Minister of Defense, Benjamin Ben Eliezer, more or less along the pre-1967 lines. In fact, the fence around the Gaza Strip was completed a long time ago and the Strip has become the largest concentration camp ever to exist." Baruch Kimmerling, *Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians* page 169 1. There is zero analysis here, just an opinion offered by the author. 6. Apartheid 1. Definitions 1. "Article 7(2)(h) "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime." 2. Prosecutions 1. No one has ever been convicted of the crime of apartheid, despite Africa carrying on its apartheid regime for almost 2 decades after the Convention Against Apartheid. 1. Two people have been indicted as of 2021 in South Africa. 3. There are no laws or policies that treat different races inside Israel differently. Most of the different treatment either comes through immigration policy (which countries have their own right to dictate) or through citizenship status. 1. The Nation State Law creates no legal distinctions between citizens and has never been utilized for legislation or policy making. 4. As applied in the different territories: 1. The Gaza Strip: There are no Jews. 2. The West Bank: Law is not applied based on racial domination, it's applied based on citizenship status. 5. The Palestinians initially compared themselves to the NLF in Algeria, and now compared themselves to South Africans. 7. Genocide 1. Was October 7th genocidal? Or any of Hamas’ actions, when they explicitly state that they want to remove or destroy a nation? 2. The ICJ case 1. The case only needed to reach the “plausibility” standard, which is incredibly low. 1. “5. The Court is not asked, in the present phase of the proceedings, to determine whether South Africa’s allegations of genocide are well founded. At this stage, the Court may only examine whether the circumstances of the present case, as they have been presented to the Court, justify the ordering (“indication”) of provisional measures to protect rights under the Genocide Convention which are at risk of being violated before the decision on the merits is rendered. For this examination, the Court need not address many well-known and controversial questions, such as those relating to the right to self-defence and the right of self-determination of peoples, or regarding territorial status. The Court must remain conscious that the Genocide Convention is not designed to regulate armed conflicts as such, even if they are conducted with an excessive use of force and result in mass casualties.” Declaration of Judge Nolte 2. “14. The information provided by South Africa regarding Israel’s military operation is not comparable to the evidence before the Court in The Gambia v. Myanmar in 2020. While the Applicant cannot now be expected to provide the Court with detailed reports of an international fact-finding mission, it is not sufficient for South Africa to point to the terrible death and destruction that Israel’s military operation has brought about and is continuing to bring about. The Applicant must be expected to engage not only with the stated purpose of the operation, namely to “destroy Hamas” and to liberate the hostages, but also with other manifest circumstances, such as the calls to the civilian population to evacuate, an official policy and orders to soldiers not to target civilians, the way in which the opposing forces are confronting each other on the ground, as well as the enabling of the delivery of a certain amount of humanitarian aid, all of which may give rise to other plausible inferences from an alleged “pattern of conduct” than genocidal intent. Rather, these measures by Israel, while not conclusive, make it at least plausible that its military operation is not being conducted with genocidal intent. South Africa has not called these underlying circumstances into question and has, in my view, not sufficiently engaged with their implications for the plausibility of the rights of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip deriving from the Genocide Convention.” - Declaration of Judge Nolte 2. Incorrect ICJ Facts 1. Why does the ICJ case say the March of Return was ”a large-scale peaceful protest along the separation fence between Gaza and Israel, in which thousands of Palestinians participated every Friday for over 18 months” when the [UN says](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/two-years-on-people-injured-and-traumatized-during-the-great-march-of-return-are-still-struggling/#:~:text=While%20the%20vast%20majority%20of,territory%3B%20the%20latter%20resulted%20in) “while the vast majority of protestors have acted in a peaceful manner, during most protests dozens have approached the fence attempting to damage it, burning tires, throwing stones and Molotov cocktails towards Israeli forces and flying incendiary kites and balloons into Israeli territory; the latter resulted in extensive damage to agricultural land and nature reserves inside Israel and risked the lives of Israeli civilians. Some incidents of shooting and throwing of explosive devices have also been reported. 1. [March of Return gender violence](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/two-years-on-people-injured-and-traumatized-during-the-great-march-of-return-are-still-struggling/) 1. Preliminary findings of a [survey](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2480.pdf) carried out by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in the second quarter of 2019 revealed that 38 per cent of women in Gaza reported some form of psychological, physical, sexual, social or economic violence by their husbands, at least once during the preceding 12 months.[7](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/two-years-people-injured-and-traumatized-during-great-march-return-are-still-struggling#ftn7) 2. While domestic violence is a longstanding concern in the oPt, the Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Sub-Cluster estimates that the GMR has exacerbated it.[[8]](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/two-years-people-injured-and-traumatized-during-great-march-return-are-still-struggling#ftn8) Evidence gathered by partners to the working group indicate that mothers have been often blamed by their husbands for the injury or death of their children during a demonstration, and experienced increased related violence. Additionally, widows are at higher risk of immediate psychological and economic violence by family members, as some are expected to re-marry and the family of the late husband often take control over their finances. Further, girls who lost a father, or have a father with a disability, are at increased risk of forced child marriage due to the decreased level of household income, as fathers/husbands are usually the breadwinner of the family. 3. Yasmin, is a 22-year-old mother living in the north area. “I used to live a happy life, but all changed after my husband was killed in May 2018, during a GMR demonstration. With my two sons I returned to my family’s house and stayed there for a year and a half. As a widow, I was under tighter control by my family.” As is customary, Yasmin was requested to marry her brother-in-law. At first, she refused, but following pressure she accepted. “I didn’t want to go back to my husband’s family home, as they treated me badly. Soon after we married, my new husband began beating me. I never imagined that someone would do that to me. After the killing of my first husband, I started to attend psychosocial support sessions. They helped me feel better, less stressed. However, after I married again, I could no longer attend as my husband’s family opposed that. Now it’s all back again.” 2. Participants in GMR were likely ruled as combatants. 1. “If some of the demonstrators can be classified as direct participants in the armed conflict that exists between Israel and the Hamas (this is certainly the case with respect to the terrorists and the armed persons among them; two close categories also includes both members of the terrorist organizations who disguise themselves as demonstrators and also participants in the protest who agree to serve as “human shields” for the terrorists hiding behind them), then the demonstrators lose the protection granted to them pursuant to the principle expressed in Article 51(3) of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which prescribes that the protection afforded to them as civilians shall be removed for such time during which they (actually) take a part in hostilities. In situations such as those, it is highly likely that the three pronged criterion – which was outlined by the team of international experts that the Red Cross convened – would be fulfilled. Upon the fulfillment of the three conditions by the demonstrators, civilians who take part in hostilities lose their protections. […]” [IHL case study website](https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/great-march-return-demonstrations-and-israels-military-response) 2. “Dumb bombs” talking point. 1. Has nothing to do with anything related to target discrimination. 3. Quotes 1. “On 12 October 2023, President Isaac Herzog made clear that Israel was not distinguishing between militants and civilians in Gaza, stating in a press conference to foreign media — in relation Palestinians in Gaza, over one million of whom are children: “It’s an entire nation out there that is responsible. It’s not true this rhetoric about civilians not aware not involved. It’s absolutely not true. … and we will fight until we break their backbone.”449 On 15 October 2023, echoing the words of Prime Minister Netanyahu, the President told foreign media that “we will uproot evil so that there will be good for the entire region and the world.”” 1. Full context, as per their own source: "It is an entire nation out there that is responsible. It's not true this rhetoric about civilians not aware, not involved. It's absolutely not true. 2. "They could have risen up, they could have fought against that evil regime which took over Gaza in a coup 'd état 3. "But we are at war, we are defending our homes, we are protecting our homes, that's the truth and when a nation protects it's home it fights and we will fight until we break their back bone." 4. He acknowledged that many Gazans had nothing to do with Hamas but was adamant that others did. 5. "I agree there are many innocent Palestinians who don't agree with this, but if you have a missile in your goddamn kitchen and you want to shoot it at me, am I allowed to defend myself. We have to defend ourselves, we have the full right to do so." 6. In Netanyahu’s speech, he says that the IDF will do what it can to minimize civilian casualties and calls upon civilians to flee south. 2. “On 9 October 2023, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant in an Israeli Army ‘situation update’ advised that Israel was “imposing a complete siege on Gaza. No electricity, no food, no water, no fuel. Everything is closed. We are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly.” He also informed troops on the Gaza border that he had “released all the restraints”, stating in terms that: “Gaza won’t return to what it was before. We will eliminate everything. If it doesn’t take one day, it will take a week. It will take weeks or even months, we will reach all places.” He further announced that Israel was moving to “a fullscale response” and that he had “removed every restriction” on Israeli forces.” 1. Human Animals 1. “But I don't think any Israeli actually understood it that way. "Chayot Adam", "Human Animals" is a common phrase in modern Hebrew, meaning "people acting in inhuman ways". An individual, moral condemnation, tied to inhuman acts. Not a racial, pseudo-biological remark. It's commonly used to describe Israeli criminals of all sorts, from rapists to gangsters. The most famous use of this phrase recently, was a [2019 remark by Oshrat Kotler, a leading Israeli news anchor](https://www.timesofisrael.com/tv-host-in-hot-water-for-saying-control-of-west-bank-turns-troops-into-animals/), as a response to a story about Israeli soldiers beating a bound Palestinian, that the soldiers sent to the West Bank return as "human animals". This was a very controversial statement, that raised a huge outcry. But even the most outraged right-winger didn't assume Kotler referred to the entire Israeli people as subhuman.” 2. The rest of this all refers to expanded military actions, none of this necessarily implies Palestinian people, nor genocidal intent. 3. “Israeli Minister of Finance: On 8 October 2023, Bezalel Smotrich stated at a meeting of the Israeli Cabinet that “[w]e need to deal a blow that hasn’t been seen in 50 years and take down Gaza.”” 1. As per their own source: The powerful finance minister, settler leader Bezalel Smotrich, demanded at the cabinet meeting late Saturday that the army “hit Hamas brutally and not take the matter of the captives into significant consideration.” “In war as in war, you have to be brutal,” he was quoted as saying. “We need to deal a blow that hasn’t been seen in 50 years and take down Gaza.” 8. "Refugee Camp" 4. These are cities. 5. UNRWA definition requirement. 9. Facts 1. Potential bad historical claims 1. The 2008 Mavi Marmara incident 1. 4THOT [summarizing](https://www.reddit.com/r/Destiny/comments/1aqu5rx/comment/kqfm238/) Finkelstein's retelling of these. 2. Iron Dome stuff 1. Norman [missed](https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2016/02/18/dont-doubt-the-iron-dome/) a huge conflict of interest with Postol’s research partners. 1. “Most of the coverage by the media referring to Pedatzur fails to note his conflict of interest as a [proponent of laser defensive systems](http://www.wired.com/2012/11/iron-dome-next/), or the fact that the system he supported was [one of the proposals rejected by Danny Gold and the IDF](http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/03/12/Whats-wrong-with-Israels-Iron-Dome-ABM-defense-system/89401236886985/). Richard Lloyd also appears to have had a serious conflict of interest. A [LinkedIn profile page appearing to belong to Mr. Lloyd](https://www.linkedin.com/in/richard-lloyd-62812031) claims to have developed a new “Iron Dome Warhead kill mechanism”. This information is dated December 2012, a full 3 months before the New York Times article was published, which should have allowed the NYT plenty of time to note Lloyd’s financial and professional conflicts of interest.” 2. Postol’s research also plagiarized pictures and relied on YT videos. 4. International support should be reserved for peaceful Palestinian movements, not violent ones. Historically, Israel has been willing to pursue reasonable attempts at peace made by her neighbors, e.g. Egypt (1979), Jordan (1994), Bahrain (2020), the UAE (2020), Morocco (2020) and Sudan (2021, and attempted to with the Palestinians (1993, 2000, [2008](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0X3cPPU7eoU)) and Syria (1967, 2000). These peace deals have come at great cost to Israeli leadership (Begin's fierce resistance from his own party for transferring the Sinai, Rabin's assassination in 1995 for the Oslo Accords) and to Arab leaders (Egypt was suspended from the Arab League for 10 years and Sadat was later assassinated for being a sell-out to the West). Palestinian leaders seem to prioritize their personal political careers and their consolidation of political support over the interests of the Palestinian people (Arafat for the Oslo Accords, and Camp David/Taba Summit, and Abbas in 2008). The Palestinians need a leader who is willing to risk some political division among the PLO/PA, and the people need to opt towards peace since that is the greatest way to apply optimal international pressure against Israel. A violent adversary has historically always given Israel room for territorial acquisition (1947-1949, 1967, 2000, 2010), while a peaceful adversary has always sparked international pressure for Israel to negotiate. 1. Why is this important? 1. Factual Disagreement - Palestinians are not improving their position through violence, yet that has been essentially their preferred arm of negotiating since 1948, with fedayeen attacks, the creation of the PLO, and international terrorist attacks. Violence has caused operations that have severely damaged Palestinian interests, such as Swords of Iron, Protective Edge, Cast Lead, and unilateral disengagement from Gaza. Violence from Palestinians has also consistently caused them to become alienated from their Arab neighbors (Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood/assassination attempts, Jordan with Abdullah's assassination in 1951, Black September in 1970, Wasfi-Tal's assassination in 1971, Lebanon from 1970-1982). 2. Moral Significance - Encouraging the Palestinians to act with violence gives Israel an excuse to continue the blockade in Gaza and to refuse Palestinians a state, while supporting Palestinian peace-makers puts pressure on Israel to come to a final settlement of the Palestinian problem while removing their justification for aggressive action. Israel's greatest fear, historically, has always been an Arab leader pushing for peace. If Arafat had pushed for peace against Israel, the settlements would be so much smaller than they are now. If Sadat hadn't pushed for peace with Israel, it's possible they would control the Sinai to this day. 2. Norm's position on violence: 1. 2015 Reddit AMA 1. ["until and unless they engage in mass nonviolent resistance, such as during the first intifada, it's hopeless"](https://i.imgur.com/wVuhCfD.png) 2. ["There's a huge reservoir of international support now for the Palestinians, while Israel's stock has plummeted. If Palestinians put forth reasonable demands (based on international law) and engaged in mass nonviolent resistance, Israel would be cornered"](https://i.imgur.com/4w3QeO6.png) 2. October 7th, 2023 on Norman's website 1. [Today they breached the camp’s walls. If we honor John Brown’s armed resistance to slavery; if we honor the Jews who revolted in the Warsaw Ghetto—then moral consistency commands that we honor the heroic resistance in Gaza. I, for one, will never begrudge—on the contrary, it warms every fiber of my soul—the scenes of Gaza’s smiling children as their arrogant Jewish supremacist oppressors have, finally, been humbled.](https://www.normanfinkelstein.com/john-browns-body-in-gaza/) 5. The basis for negotiations is only informed by international law, not defined by it. None of Israel's major prior bilateral negotiations with any partners (Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco, Sudan) have been restricted by UN resolutions or international law. These negotiations have only succeeded when both parties were willing to recognize the political, social and military realities on the ground that both sides could reasonably agree to. Harping over and over again on "moral" interpretations of international law is meaningless, as Israel will not realistically begin negotiations in any place that calls for them to return to prior rejected arrangements (1947 partition plan, 2000 Taba Summit). 1. Why is this important? 1. Factual Disagreement - Negotiations historically for Israel have not been restricted to international law or UN Resolutions. Negotiations need to begin with intense consideration for the realities on the ground. 2. Moral Significance - Fixating on certain interpretations of international law will continue to drive Palestinian expectations to unrealistic heights. International law is not going to expel 450,000 Israeli's from the West Bank. 2. The legality of the settlements 1. "Recalling the obligation under the Quartet Roadmap, endorsed by its resolution 1515 (2003), for a freeze by Israel of all settlement activity, including “natural growth”, and the dismantlement of all settlement outposts erected since March 2001." - [SC 2334 (2016)](https://www.un.org/webcast/pdfs/SRES2334-2016.pdf) 3. Resolution 242 1. Not legally binding, this was passed under Chapter VI of the UN charter. 1. The "peaceful resolution" requirement of this was violated by every Arab state in 1973, and was continually violated by the PLO and any other group that engaged in violence against Israel to "end the occupation." 2. This shaped the resolutions between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Oslo I and Oslo II, yet did not lead to the creation of any permanent state of permanent resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 3. "There was much bickering over whether that resolution should say from "the" territories or from "all" territories. In the French version, which is equally authentic, it says withdrawal de territory, with de meaning "the." We wanted that to be left a little vague and subject to future negotiation because we thought the Israeli border along the West Bank could be "rationalized"; certain anomalies could easily be straightened out with some exchanges of territory, making a more sensible border for all parties. We also wanted to leave open demilitarization measures in the Sinai and the Golan Heights and take a fresh look at the old city of Jerusalem." - Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, *As I Saw It*, page 389. 4. "And it was only when this euphemism was embedded in the language of a UN Security Council Resolution that Israel was ready to endorse it. The constructive ambiguity of the November 1967 Security Council Resolution Number 242, which called for peace based on the restitution of ‘territories’ instead of ‘the territories’, allowed Israel to claim that the borders would have to be modified on all fronts as a condition for peace and gave maneuvering space to her post-war diplomacy. Resolution 242 was the result of the need to find a formula that would reconcile Israel’s unrealistic expectation to have full peace for less than all the territories, and the Arabs’ drive for a full restitution of land in exchange for a watered-down state of non-belligerency." - Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace* page 128 4. Who has the majority support right now in the region? 1. Israel 1. Normalization of relations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, UAE, Bahrain, (Saudi Arabia), formal treaties signed by Egypt. 2. Palestine 1. Recognition? 3. USA 1. Public still overwhelming supports Israel and their mission to remove Hamas. [source](https://twitter.com/Osint613/status/1762532215647260785/photo/1) 5. Norm's references to this. 1. ["If you're serious about trying to build a mass movement, you can't go beyond what the public is ready to accept."](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ASIBGSSw4lI) 2. ["If you want to use the law to reach public opinion, you can't be selective with the law."](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ASIBGSSw4lI) 3. Does Norm still support the Houthis? 6. The Palestinian refugee problem is being artificially inflated. There are no other groups of refugees on the planet that have the unique treatment right now afforded to the Palestinians, and it only serves to drive a deeper wedge in between Israelis and Palestinians in regards to solving this conflict. 1. Why is this important? 1. Factual Disagreement - The Palestinian refugee situation is unacceptable. No other refugee group has this treatment. 2. Moral Significance - The artificial treatment of Palestinian refugees keeps prolonging the suffering of both Palestinians in Palestine and outside of it because it makes it more difficult for any final agreement to be reached, while simultaneously preventing Palestinians outside of Palestine from ever being settled into a new home. 2. Facts 1. UNRWA refusal to resettle. Arab League Resolution 1547 (Khartoum Conference), definition of refugee/refugee camp. 3. UNRWA regulations on refugees 1. "The descendants of Palestine refugee males, including adopted children, are also eligible for registration." [UNRWA on Palestinian Refugees](https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees?__cf_chl_tk=wFLu5RS.jlQ86iozAz3LAz84PwNzLqrICU4AIPPXd0g-1708895548-0.0-4071) 4. Unrealistic expectations from the Palestinians. 1. "The essence of the right of return is choice: Palestinians should be given the option to choose where they wish to settle, including return to the homes from which they were driven. There is no historical precedent for a people abandoning their fundamental right to return to their homes whether they were forced to leave or fled in fear. We will not be the first people to do so. Recognition of the right of return and the provision of choice to refugees is a pre-requisite for the closure of the conflict." - [Reservations to the Clinton Parameters](https://ynet-pic1.yit.co.il/picserver5/wcm_upload_files/2023/06/18/ryrrtanDh/00071706_82_32_F1_56.pdf). 5. Euphemisms 1. "Refugee camp" = cities 2. "Refugees" - you can be born in another country, with full citizenship, and social services, etc...etc... 7. Israel's *jus ad bellum*, their response to Hamas invading their country and killing 1,139 people in Israel ([695 civilians, 373 security forces and 71 foreigners](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231215-israel-social-security-data-reveals-true-picture-of-oct-7-deaths)) and taking some 250 hostages, is fully in compliance with international law. All available evidence of Israel taking extraordinary steps to warn civilian populations of incoming attacks likely satisfies their obligation to Article 58 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, while death and casualty numbers in the highly urbanized environment seem to satisfy that Israel is distinguishing between targets (an obligation under API Article 48). On the contrary, Hamas had no good *jus ad bellum* as their October 7th attack was not preventing or in response to any incoming Israeli attack, and their *jus in bello* is clearly not justified as they have failed to uphold their obligations (under API Article 58) to protect their civilian population, failed to distinguish between military and civilian targets, and utilized their civilian population in an attempt to shield themselves from Israeli military forces. 1. Why is this important? 1. Factual Disagreement - Claims that Israel is conducting themselves in a way that, by policy, disagrees with the LoAC is entirely unsubstantiated, and has been for all of their major Gaza conflicts. Claims that excuses Hamas' actions, or make them comparable to the Israeli government, are completely absurd. 2. Moral Significance - Israel, morally, has a right to defend itself. Drawing false equivalences between Hamas and Israel, especially by incorrectly citing international law and disregarding the laws of armed conflict, undermines the validity of international law and endangers the safety of all civilians in future armed conflict. It is also essential to recognize that Israel, a Democratic country that is sensitive to the whims of its voters and to international pressure, has made much more information available from its archive than the parties they face. Their reluctance to participate in certain international investigations is understandable. 2. International humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict. 1. IHL seeks to balance two key goals – military necessity and humanity. In this way, the law protects civilians from the ravages of war while still enabling effec- tive military operations. Interpretations of the law that leave militaries with no lawful means by which to engage in necessary operations are often viewed as counter-productive and pose the risk of generating disregard for legal norms. The Goldstone Report unfortunately fails to give sufficient weight to this inherent bal- ancing – the most basic and historic premise of humanitarian law: the ‘desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit’. - Laurie R. Blank, “> THE APPLICATION OF IHL IN THE GOLDSTONE REPORT: A CRITICAL COMMENTARY 3. Lack of accountability 1. “The Gaza Strip falls under the jurisdiction of the PA according to the Oslo Accords (pursuant to which the PA was established). However, in June 2007, after armed confrontations with PA forces, Hamas established a de facto administration in Gaza and has since controlled internal affairs there, including the administration of justice. The Hamas de facto administration has neither prosecuted nor shown any intention to prosecute members of its armed wing or members of other armed groups responsible for firing rockets into southern Israel. On the contrary, during periods when they are not committed to a ceasefire with Israel, Hamas leaders promote such unlawful attacks.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 4. *Jus ad bellum* 1. Israel 1. Self-defense, destruction of Hamas, fully justified. 2. Hamas 1. They have no cause for war. Occupation is not a cause for war. 5. *Jus in bello* 1. Principle of distinction 1. The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants 1. Rule 1 of IHL, The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants 2. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians. 2. Violations 1. “Mortars and so-called Qassam rockets, which are locally made in Gaza, and longer range Grad-type rockets smuggled into Gaza via the tunnels from Egypt, are unguided projectiles which cannot be directed at specific targets. Attacks using such rockets are indiscriminate and hence unlawful under international law.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 2. “Between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009 the armed wing of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups based in Gaza launched rockets and mortars 109 on a daily basis into towns and villages in southern Israel, as well as against Israeli military positions and patrols inside Gaza and along Gaza’s perimeter.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 3. “In other words, these weapons cannot be accurately aimed in a manner that distinguishes between military objectives and civilian objects, as required by international humanitarian law. Hence, when these weapons were used with the intent of striking military targets in Israel, but struck civilian objects instead, they constituted indiscriminate attacks. When rocket attacks were intended to strike homes, civilian infrastructure or civilians, they were direct attacks on civilians or civilian objects. In either case, such attacks constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law and are war crimes (see Chapter 5).“ - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 4. “On at least one occasion a Palestinian rocket which fell short of its target landed inside Gaza and caused damage to a World Food Programme (WPF) warehouse near the Karni merchandise crossing between Israel and Gaza (the crossing has been closed since 2007). The warehouse is usually guarded by Israeli forces and since the beginning of Operation “Cast Lead” no UN staff members had been present there. The rocket strike caused no casualties but it damaged the warehouse, which at the time contained 400 tons of food and non-food items. The UN Board of Inquiry found that the damage to the warehouse was caused by a Qassam-type rocket locally manufactured in Gaza.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 5. “In response, the groups have argued that they have no other weapons, nor any way of obtaining precision weapons like those used by the Israeli army. They also say that they are acting in response to Israeli attacks which have killed more than 1,000 Palestinians for each Israeli killed by rockets. Some have argued that the attacks are aimed at Israeli military bases or positions in and around towns and villages in southern Israel and that the Israeli villages around Gaza are mostly military bases. While some of the rockets might strike military targets, which the groups would consider strategically more valuable, the argument is invalidated both by the obviously indiscriminate nature of the attacks and by the fact that whenever the rockets strike people these are invariably civilians. Other spokespeople have argued that the rockets are rarely lethal and that their main aim is to “disturb” life in Israel so long as Israel does not allow Palestinians to have a normal life. All these arguments are inadmissible under international humanitarian law. Whether or not attacks actually result in civilian casualties, they are in violation of international law, which also prohibits attacks aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population. The patterns of attacks and statements by members and leaders of Palestinian groups also indicate that they have no qualms about launching attacks against civilians and that they in fact carry out such attacks intending to kill and injure Israeli civilians. Such attacks constitute war crimes.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 6. “The organization has stated that the campaign of suicide bombings and other attacks against civilians by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups amounted to crimes against humanity.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 2. Principle of proportionality 1. Principle of Proportionality in Attack 1. Rule 14 of IHL, Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited. 2. This principle is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of AP I, and repeated in Article 57. 3. Under the statue of the ICC, “intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects … which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated” 1. The overall military advantage anticipated is important. 2. Violations 1. Every single attack into Israel fails the proportionality check. The rocket attacks are indiscriminate and are rarely aimed at military installations or positions. 3. Principle of precaution 1. Principle of Precautions in Attack 1. Rule 15 of IHL, In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 2. Violations 1. Every single Hamas attack is a violation of this rule. Hamas does not ever take time to warn the Israeli civilian population in any way before engaging in attacks 4. Human Shields 1. Rule 97, The Use of Human Shields is prohibited. 1. The prohibition of using human shields in the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I and the Statute of the International Criminal Court are couched in terms of using the presence (or movements) of civilians or other protected persons to render certain points or areas (or military forces) immune from military operations. 2. It can be concluded that the use of human shields requires an intentional co-location of military objectives and civilians or persons _hors de combat_ with the specific intent of trying to prevent the targeting of those military objectives. 2. Article 58 of AP I also precautions against the effects of attack. 1. The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible: 1. without prejudice to Article [49](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/9AC284404D38ED2BC1256311002AFD89/77068F12B8857C4DC12563CD0051BDB0) of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives; 2. avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas; 3. take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations. 3. Violations 1. Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups also violated international humanitarian law in their conduct within Gaza. They launched rockets and located military equipment and Amnesty International July 2009 Israel/Gaza: Operation ‘Cast Lead’: 22 days of death and destruction positions near civilian homes, endangering the lives of the inhabitants by exposing them to the risk of Israeli attacks. They also used empty homes and properties as combat positions during armed confrontations with Israeli forces, exposing the inhabitants of nearby houses to the danger of attacks or of being caught in the crossfire.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 2. ”Between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009 the armed wing of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups based in Gaza launched rockets and mortars 109 on a daily basis into towns and villages in southern Israel, as well as against Israeli military positions and patrols inside Gaza and along Gaza’s perimeter.“ - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 3. “Hamas and other armed groups also endangered Palestinian civilians by failing to take all feasible precautions in the conduct of their military activities, notably by firing rockets from residential areas and storing weapons, explosives and ammunition in them. They also mixed with the civilian population, although this would be difficult to avoid in the small and overcrowded Gaza Strip, and there is no evidence that they did so with the intent of shielding themselves. The extremely high population density in Gaza, a small territory and one of the most densely populated places in the world, entails additional challenges for all the parties involved in conflict or armed confrontations. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Hamas and other armed groups have an obligation to avoid conduct which, by intent or through recklessness, exposes the civilian population to danger, and have an obligation not to use the civilian population as a cover for their military activities. Intentionally using civilians to shield a military objective – often referred to as using “human shields” – is a war crime” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 4. “Hamas and other Palestinian groups endangered civilians by firing rockets from populated residential neighbourhoods.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 5. “In another area of Gaza City, a resident showed Amnesty International delegates a place from where a rocket had been launched: a small patch of empty land some 50m from residential houses. Television footage from the Arabic TV station al-Arabiya broadcast during Operation “Cast Lead” also showed a presenter, seemingly caught off guard, saying that she had just heard a rocket being fired from the street near the building which houses the TV station, in the centre of Gaza City.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 6. “Hamas and other groups generally store weapons in civilian areas and there is no reason to believe that it was any different during Operation “Cast Lead”. By doing so, it rendered such locations possible targets of attack and therefore exposed civilians who may have been present to risk.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 7. “The groups openly acknowledge that their fighters and military facilities are present in towns and villages in Gaza, but argue that their role is to defend their communities against Israeli attacks and invasions.“ - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 8. “Some of the armed groups deny having fired rockets from populated areas or having stored them there, while others argue that they were merely defending their communities and that Israeli forces targeted civilians not involved in military activities and locations from which no attacks had been launched.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 9. “The placing of combatants and a variety of weapons within towns and villages by Hamas and Israel, while not in itself of evidence of using “human shields”, does amount to a violation of their obligation to take the necessary precautions to protect civilians under its control from the dangers of military operations “to the maximum extent feasible”, and in particular “avoiding locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas”.” - Amensty International 2009, OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 5. Destroying civilian infrastructure 1. Applicable international law 2. Destroying civilian infrastructure is not a war crime. 6. Comparisons to other conflicts 1. The Nat Turner comparison completely fails. 1. The Palestinians in the Gaza strip are not in any ways chattel slavery like African slaves imported to the United States. The conditions are not even remotely comparable and it is grossly downplaying the institution of slavery in the United States to pretend. 2. The Nat Turner rebellion was composed of slaves who fought with knives, hatchets and fence posts. Hamas receive international aid from all over the world, taxes from smuggled goods, military training from Iran, financing from Qatar, and smuggle weapons and components for rockets into their territory, all to the detriment of the people they are supposed to be administering to. 2. The Warsaw Ghetto uprising quite literally would have been justified in every sense of the word. 1. The Jews were fighting against SS Soldiers that were coming to the ghetto to take them to a concentration camp where Jewish people were already being exterminated. 2. The Jews were not an organized army receiving funding and training from countries and militaries around the world - on the contrary, their plight was being completely ignored. 3. The Jews were not targeting civilians, they were fighting against soldiers coming into deport them to Treblinka and Majdanek. 7. The Blockade 1. Impacts to Palestinians https://colemanhughes.substack.com/p/what-are-conditions-in-gaza-like 2. And Finkelstein’s apologia for the 10/7 Hamas fighters––who were presumably in their late teens and 20s––is that they were _“[born into](https://youtu.be/EFbdKdwqlZw?si=_cTjyiNWz1qibJmK&t=1279)_ a concentration camp” and have known nothing else–– which suggests that Gaza has been a concentration camp for almost two decades. 8. Contemporary issues undermining the International Community position 1. Al-Shifa hospital stuff 1. How much warning did Israel give before attacking the hospital? 2. UNRWA 3. Hospital staff in al-Shifa 4. Workers affiliated with Hamas 5. Huge tunnel near UNRWA building/area 6. Tunnels 7. Munition stores 9. List conditions for peace/objectives on both sides, Israel vs Hamas. 1. Administrative Detention of Palestinian 10. When Israel leaves things get bad - Gaza Strip 2005, West Bank/Second Intifada (2000-2005), Lebanon (Hezbollah) 11. Ceasefires broken by both sides